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SUMMARY 
 
This dissertation aimed to detect and distinguish between minimal conditions for 
the interindividual-intergroup discontinuity effect. To date, research has focused on 
moderators (e.g., Wildschut et al., 2003) and explanations (e.g, Wildschut & Insko, 
2007) for the robust phenomenon that intergroup interactions are less cooperative than 
interindividual interactions. Here, “groups” were mainly treated as aggregates of 
positively interdependent actors, indicating an interdependence-based perspective of 
group formation. In bringing together research on interindividual-intergroup 
discontinuity and social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986) it has been 
reasoned that the effect is also in line with an identity-based perspective of group 
formation. Furthermore, it has been argued that interdependence-based and identity-
based processes were typically confounded in previous research on interindividual-
intergroup discontinuity. 
 The aim of the present thesis was to disentangle the effects of interdependence-
based and identity-based group formation on the emergence of the discontinuity effect. 
It was hypothesized that mere identity-based group formation may be sufficient to 
decrease actors’ cooperation in mixed-motive situations, and therefore, to account for 
interindividual-intergroup discontinuity. Moreover, it was hypothesized that part of the 
classical discontinuity effect may be attributed to identity-based group processes.  
Four experiments with real-time interactions and monetary incentives were 
conducted to test the outlined hypotheses. Using a new experimental paradigm, Studies 
1 and 2 manipulated actors’ interdependence (independent vs. interdependent outcomes) 
and identity salience (personal vs. social identity salience) independent and orthogonal 
to each other. They provided strong support across two different mixed-motive games 
(Study 1: ultimatum bargaining game, Study 2: prisoner’s dilemma game) for the 
hypothesis that identity salience may be sufficient to create interindividual-intergroup 
discontinuity, whereas outcome interdependence may not. Mediation analyses provided 
additional support for the proposed identity-based perspective on the discontinuity 
effect: Social identity salience increased actors’ perceived similarity to own team 
members relative to opponent team members in the interdependent outcomes condition 
(Study 2), and increased actors’ perception of all participants as members of two 
distinct social categories in the independent outcomes condition (Study 3), both 
predicting defection in the mixed-motive game. Moreover, in line with social identity 
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theory, the motivation to maximize relative outcomes differences to the opponent(s) 
mediated the effect of identity salience on mixed-motive game behavior (Study 2). Last 
but not least, Study 4 showed that intragroup discussions prior to decision-making in the 
intergroup interaction condition of the classical experimental paradigm on 
interindividual-intergroup discontinuity might be a possible source of social identity 
salience. This indicates that identity-based processes might have played an important 
role for the emergence of previously detected discontinuity effects. 
 Summing up, this thesis expands hitherto existing knowledge about the minimal 
conditions that may be sufficient to create the interindividual-intergroup discontinuity 
effect. I presented an experimental paradigm that is able to distinguish between several 
structural and psychological factors that have influence on this phenomenon. The results 
supported the generality of the discontinuity effect: It applies even for mere identity-
based groups, irrespective whether group members share an objective common fate 
(i.e., outcome interdependence) or not. The findings might be used to find alternative 
ways to reduce the interindividual-intergroup discontinuity effect. 
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 	  
Die vorliegende Dissertation hatte das Ziel minimale Bedingungen für den 
interindividuellen-intergruppalen Diskontinuitätseffekt aufzudecken und zu 
unterscheiden. Bisher fokussierte die Forschung darauf, Moderatoren (z.B. Wildschut et 
al., 2003) und Erklärungen (z.B. Wildschut & Insko, 2007) für das robuste Phänomen 
zu finden, dass Interaktionen zwischen Gruppen weniger kooperativ sind als 
Interaktionen zwischen Individuen. Hierbei wurden „Gruppen“ mehrheitlich als 
Aggregate von positiv interdependenten Akteuren behandelt, welches eine 
interdependenzbasierte Perspektive der Gruppenformierung zu Grunde legt. Durch 
Verknüpfung der Forschung zum interindividuellen-intergruppalen 
Diskontinuitätseffekt und der Theorie der sozialen Identität (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 
1986) wurde geschlussfolgert, dass der Effekt ebenfalls im Einklang mit einer 
identitätsbasierten Perspektive der Gruppenformierung steht. Darüber hinaus wurde 
argumentiert, dass interdependenzbasierte und identitätsbasierte Prozesse in der 
bisherigen Forschung zum Diskontinuitätseffekt typischerweise konfundiert waren.  
 Ziel der vorliegenden Arbeit war es die Effekte der interdependenzbasierten und 
identitätsbasierten Gruppenformierung auf die Entstehung des Diskontinuitätseffekts 
getrennt voneinander zu untersuchen. Es wurde hypothetisiert, dass eine reine 
identitätsbasierte Gruppenbildung ausreichen kann um die Kooperation von Akteuren in 
Situationen mit gemischten Motiven zu verringern, und daher den interindividuellen-
intergruppalen Diskontinuitätseffekt zu erzeugen. Weiterhin wurde hypothetisiert, dass 
der klassischerweise aufgedeckte Diskontinuitätseffekt zumindest teilweise auf 
identitätsbasierte Gruppenprozesse zurückzuführen ist. 
 Vier Verhaltensexperimente mit Echtzeit-Interaktionen und monetären Anreizen 
wurden durchgeführt um die ausgeführten Hypothesen zu testen. Unter Verwendung 
eines neuartigen experimentellen Paradigmas wurde in den Studien 1 und 2 die 
Interdependenz der Akteure (independent vs. interdependent) und Identitätssalienz 
(personale vs. soziale Identitätssalienz) unabhängig und orthogonal zueinander 
manipuliert. Die Studien unterstützen über zwei verschiedene Situationen mit 
gemischten Motiven (Studie 1: Ultimatum-Spiel, Studie 2: Gefangenendilemma) die 
Hypothese, dass Identitätssalienz ausreichen kann um interindividuelle-intergruppale 
Diskontinuität zu erzeugen. Hingegen war Ergebnisinterdependenz hierfür nicht 
ausreichend. Mediatioranalysen erbrachten zusätzliche Unterstützung für die 
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vorgeschlagene identitätsbasierte Perspektive auf den Diskontinuitätseffekt: Soziale 
Identitätssalienz erhöhte die wahrgenommene Ähnlichkeit der Akteure zu den 
Mitgliedern des eigenen Interaktionsteams relativ zu den Mitgliedern des gegnerischen 
Interaktionsteams in der Interdependenzbedingung (Studie 2), und erhöhte die 
Wahrnehmung der Akteure, dass alle Versuchsteilnehmer zu zwei verschiedenen 
sozialen Kategorien gehören in der Independenzbedingung (Studie 3). Beides sagte 
wiederum defektives Verhalten im Spiel mit gemischten Motiven vorher. Darüber 
hinaus und im Einklang mit der Theorie der sozialen Identität mediierte die Motivation 
relative Unterschiede zum Gegenspieler zu maximieren den Effekt der Identitätssalienz 
auf Interaktionsverhalten (Studie 2). Nicht zuletzt zeigte Studie 4, dass Intragruppen-
Diskussionen vor der Entscheidungsfindung in der Intergruppeninteraktionsbedingung 
des klassischen experimentellen Paradigmas zur interindividuellen-intergruppalen 
Diskontinuität eine mögliche Quelle für soziale Identitätssalienz darstellen können. Dies 
legt nahe, dass identitätsbasierte Prozesse eine Rolle bei der Entstehung bisher 
beobachteter Diskontinuitätseffekte gespielt haben könnten.  
 Zusammenfassend kann gesagt werden, dass die vorliegende Arbeit das 
bisherige Wissen über minimale Bedingungen, welche ausreichen um den 
interindividuellen-intergruppalen Diskontinuitätseffekt zu erzeugen, erweitert. Ich habe 
ein experimentelles Paradigma vorgestellt, welches in der Lage ist zwischen 
verschiedenen strukturellen und psychologischen Einflüssen auf dieses Phänomen zu 
unterscheiden. Die Ergebnisse unterstützen die Generalisierbarkeit des 
Diskontinuitätseffekts: Dieser gilt sogar bei reinen identitätsbasierten Gruppen, 
unabhängig davon ob die Gruppenmitglieder ein gemeinsames Schicksal (z.B. 
Ergebnisinterdependenz) teilen oder nicht. Die Ergebnisse könnten genutzt werden um 
alternative Wege für die Reduzierung des interindividuellen-intergruppalen 
Diskontinuitätseffekts zu finden. 
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1  INTRODUCTION 	  
“[…] the quality of mob behavior has always required explanation  
because of its apparent discontinuity  
with the private characters of the individuals involved.” 
Roger Brown (1954, p. 843) 	  
 Every day people have to make countless social decisions. Some of them may be 
the result of deliberate reasoning others may be rather spontaneous. Some of them may 
affect only the decision-maker others may also have consequences for other persons. 
Some of them may create a dilemma for decision-makers because they constitute a 
conflict between the decision-maker’s self-interest and other persons’ interests. 
Furthermore, the situation becomes complicated if a decision’s outcome is not only 
determined by one decision-maker but by two or even more decision-makers whose 
outcomes are mutual interdependent. Research in Economics, Political Science, and 
Psychology intensively studied social dilemma situations, identifying when people 
decide and how and why. However, for a very long time it has been ignored that 
decision-makers are not always individual persons but may also be groups of several 
persons. For instance, two firms might either cooperate or compete with each other. One 
manager in each firm or groups of managers who have shared responsibility might take 
decisions that affect the outcomes of employees of both firms. The structure of conflict 
between opponents may be exactly the same in both cases but the decision-makers 
differ: either individuals or groups.  
 The present work examined the effect of different types of decision-maker on 
choices in simple two-actor social dilemmas. Particularly, this dissertation contributes 
to research that investigates behavioral differences between individual actors and 
groups as decision-makers. Because individuals as well as groups are decision-makers 
in many real-life conflict situations (e.g., political and economic conflicts), it is 
important to explore behavioral differences in their decision-making. It is not trivial to 
explain why individuals and groups differ in their behavioral tendencies in conflict 
situations. There is plenty of research and theoretical formulations on both 
interindividual and intergroup relations separately, however, we still poorly understand 
when and why individual and group decisions differ. The present research contributes to 
a better understanding of behavioral differences between interindividual and intergroup 
interactions by investigating its minimal structural and psychological conditions. I offer 
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both theoretical arguments and empirical evidence that support an identity-based 
perspective on behavioral differences between interindividual and intergroup 
interactions. In this chapter I will give an overview about the topic of interest and 
review previous research before conveying aims and hypotheses of the present research.  
 
1.1  HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
 
Whether groups differ in their behavior from individuals has been an important 
question in scholarly pieces of centuries. The discussion can be traced back to the 4th 
century before Christ, when the Greek philosopher Plato wrote The Republic. In this 
comprehensive Socratic dialogue he proposed that an enlightened individual – the 
Philosopher King – should rule the society as democracy offers the danger to empower 
irrational mobs (Plato, trans. 2008). Later philosophers and politicians adopted Plato’s 
view and expressed their concerns with regard to the political empowerment of groups, 
too. For instance, Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay noticed that 
civilized individuals often become hostile and deceitful when banded together in 
groups. They critically analyzed in the Federalist Papers: “In all very numerous 
assemblies, of whatever character composed, passion never fails to wrest the scepter 
from reason. Had every Athenian citizen been a Socrates, every Athenian assembly 
would still have been a mob” (Publius, 1788/1991, No. 55).1 When group psychology 
became a topic of scientific treaties in the late 19th and early 20th century, a pioneer of 
the field, Gustave Le Bon, proposed that groups are prone to act more primitively and 
destructively than individuals. His main argument was that group members’ behavior is 
disposed by a mental possession of a collective crowd mind. Capturing his analysis in a 
nutshell, he wrote: “Isolated he may be a cultivated individual; in a crowd, he is a 
barbarian – that is, a creature acting by instinct.” (1895/1996, p. 13). Later 
psychologists picked up Le Bon’s idea that mental operations and actions of group 
members may differ essentially from those of isolated individuals (e.g., McDoughall, 
1920), which has been designated as “the ‘master problem’ of social psychology” 
(Allport, 1962, p. 7). Nevertheless, this issue became quite late target of systematic 
experimental investigations. To contrast behavior of groups and individuals one needs a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The Federalist Papers is a series of 85 essays and displays the primary source for interpretation of the 
U.S. constitution. It has been published under the pseudonym Publius, in honor of the Roman consul 
Publius Valerius Publicola (5th century before Christ). 
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comparable conceptualization of group behavior and individual behavior. However, 
individuals cannot engage in the kind of hostile behavior that is shown by groups and 
with which Le Bon, McDoughall and others were concerned, like large-scale violence 
and wars (Insko & Schopler, 1998; Schopler, Insko, Graetz, & Drigotas, 1991). To 
compare individuals and groups in the domain of aggression or competition requires the 
presence of a target. Consequently, an adequate conceptualization to examine this issue 
is the contrast between interindividual and intergroup behavior. The following 
subchapter will give an overview about research methods and findings of investigations 
that contrasted interindividual and intergroup interactions, describing the so-called 
interindividual-intergroup discontinuity effect. 
 
1.2  INTERINDIVIDUAL-INTERGROUP DISCONTINUITY 
 
“Once individuals are submerged in a group,  
they seem to transform from a Dr. Jekyll to a Mr. Hyde […]” 
Hein F. M. Lodewijkx (2001, p. 166) 
 
More than two decades of research have compared systematically interindividual 
and intergroup interactions in the context of mixed-motive situations. These interactions 
are characterized by a situation in which opponents’ interests partially correspond and 
partially conflict with each other (Schelling, 1960). In other words, actors are faced with 
a conflict between actions that follow the motives to either selfishly maximize own 
outcomes (defect) or to maximize joint outcomes (cooperate) – therefore mixed-motive 
situations. There are numerous experimental games that capture mixed-motive 
structures, most prominently the prisoner’s dilemma game. To contrast behavior of 
groups and individuals in mixed-motive situations, opponents are either unitary groups 
(mostly three-persons groups, 3 : 3) or individuals (1 : 1). In a typical experiment 
comparing interindividual and intergroup relations, opponents – either individuals or 
groups – are located in different rooms. Participants receive instructions of rules and 
examples of a mixed-motive game, typically the prisoner’s dilemma game. After 
examining the mixed-motive situation, individuals or group representatives meet in a 
central room to discuss possible actions. Finally, opponents make separate decisions in 
their homerooms. Groups typically have to reach a joint decision after having a group 
discussion or a majority rule is applied to achieve a group decision.  
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Bornstein (2003, 2008) proposed a taxonomy of mixed-motive games by types 
of decision-makers, distinguishing between separated individuals, unitary (cooperative) 
teams, and non-cooperative groups (see Table 1).  
 
Table 1. Taxonomy of mixed-motive games by types of decision-makers (adapted from 
Bornstein, 2003, 2008) 
Opponent 
Player 
Nature 
Individual  
(I) 
Unitary Team 
(U) 
Non-
cooperative 
Group (G) 
Individual  
(I) 
I I-I I-U I-G 
Unitary Team 
(U) 
U U-I U-U U-G 
Non-
cooperative 
Group (G) 
G G-I G-U G-G 
Note. Research on interindividual-intergroup discontinuity contrasts I-I interactions with U-U 
interactions, depicted in gray 
 
Hereafter, individuals are independent decision-makers. For example, the I-I cell 
represents the literature on two-person games (see e.g., Komorita & Parks, 1995 for an 
overview). Unitary teams consist of several interdependent individuals that have to 
reach a binding joint decision. Reaching a joint team decision is costless and there is no 
conflict of interest between members of the same team. For example, research in the U 
cell represents the literature on decision-making by (unitary) groups (e.g., Davis, 1992). 
In contrast, non-cooperative groups are faced with an intragroup conflict among 
(interdependent) group members. Here, group members make individual decisions, 
which are then aggregated to a group decision. For example, the G cell represents the 
literature on non-cooperative n-person games, particularly the public goods literature 
(see e.g., Ledyard, 1995 for an overview). In the context of research on interindividual-
intergroup discontinuity, there is no structural conflict of interests within teams and 
teams typically reach a joint decision. According to Bornstein’s classification, the 
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behavioral comparison that is made in the experimental setting of interindividual-
intergroup discontinuity is that of the I-I cell to the U-U cell.  
In one of the first experiments manipulating the type of decision-maker in 
mixed-motive situations, McCallum and colleagues (1985) found that intergroup 
interactions (i.e., the U-U cell) were significantly less cooperative than interindividual 
interactions (i.e., the I-I cell) on both a prisoner’s dilemma game matrix and a mutual 
fate control matrix. Using the metaphor of the title of this dissertation, if actors interact 
in an interindividual context, they are typically friendly like a sheep. If actors interact in 
an intergroup context, however, they are typically aggressive like a wolf. An impressive 
body of research demonstrated the robustness and generalizability of this effect in both 
laboratory and non-laboratory settings (for reviews see Schopler & Insko, 1992; 
Schopler et al., 2001; Wildschut & Insko, 2007; Wildschut, Pinter, Vevea, Insko, & 
Schopler, 2003). Because of this discontinuity between behaviors as a function of type 
of decision-maker, this phenomenon has been labeled the interindividual-intergroup 
discontinuity effect.2 Its robustness and the fact that core elements of mixed-motive 
games are represented in many situations of everyday life make the discontinuity effect 
an important field of research in social science. Previous research mainly focused on 
two questions: First, what is the generality of the effect? And second, what are the 
underlying psychological mechanisms responsible for the effect? In the following, 
research aiming to answer these questions is reviewed. 	  
1.2.1  Generality of interindividual-intergroup discontinuity 
 
The interindividual-intergroup discontinuity effect appeared across different 
situations and samples. Most of the evidence comes from laboratory research in Social 
Psychology and Behavioral Economics comparing interindividual and intergroup 
interactions on various mixed-motive situations. The majority of experiments used the 
prisoner’s dilemma game (PDG) or some modification (e.g., PDG-alt, Insko, Kirchner, 
Pinter, Efaw, & Wildschut, 2005; PDR, Insko et al., 1992), but the effect has also been 
shown by investigating other mixed-motive games, for instance the chicken game 
(Wolf, Insko, Kirchner, & Wildschut, 2008), the ultimatum bargaining game (Bornstein 
& Yaniv, 1998), the centipede game (Bornstein, Kugler, & Ziegelmeyer, 2004), the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 The labels interindividual-intergroup discontinuity effect, interindividual-intergroup discontinuity, and 
discontinuity effect are used as synonyms for the same phenomenon. 
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trust game (Kugler, Bornstein, Kocher, & Sutter, 2007), contest games (Tullock's 
contest: Abbink, Brandts, Herrmann, & Orzen, 2010; beauty contest game: Kocher & 
Sutter, 2005) and team games (intergroup prisoner’s dilemma game and intergroup 
public goods; Insko et al., 1994). Moreover, the effect has been found when the mixed-
motive game was framed as a realistic situation (i.e., exchange of folded origami 
figures; Schopler et al., 2001) as well as in a non-laboratory diary study (Pemberton, 
Insko, & Schopler, 1996). Mostly, participants have been North-American, but the 
effect has also been documented among Dutch (e.g., Wildschut, Lodewijkx, & Insko, 
2001), Israeli (e.g., Bornstein & Yaniv, 1998), and Japanese participants (Takemura & 
Yuki, 2007).  
A meta-analytic review of 130 comparisons (Wildschut et al., 2003) of 
interindividual and intergroup interactions in the context of mixed-motive situations 
(Wildschut et al., 2003) revealed four moderators of the discontinuity effect (ranked 
according to the meta-analytic effect sizes): (1) opponent strategy, (2) communication 
between opponents, (3) conflict of interest, and (4) procedural interdependence between 
group members. Additionally, recent research indicated that (5) actors’ guilt proneness 
might also serve as a moderator variable for interindividual-intergroup discontinuity.  
First, the discontinuity effect is larger if the opponent strategy is unconstrained 
or constrained-cooperative than when it is reciprocal. The majority of discontinuity 
experiments examined real-time interactions in which the choice of both sides was 
unconstrained. However, some studies investigated individual and group decisions in 
relation with programmed opponent behaviors. If the opponent’s behavior is 
(programmed) reciprocal to the actor’s choices (e.g., tit-for-tat strategy; Axelrod, 1984), 
actors can maximize long-term outcomes by (mutual) cooperation, whereas they can 
maximize long-term outcomes if they are faced with a (programmed) constrained-
cooperative opponent strategy by responding defectively. Both individuals and groups 
tended to cooperate with reciprocal opponents and the discontinuity effect shrunk or 
even disappeared, which is in line with the notion of long-term outcome maximization 
(Insko et al., 1998, 2001). Opponent strategy is closely related to another structural 
characteristic of the interaction situation, namely whether there is a one-shot interaction 
or an iterated (repeated) interaction. A reciprocal opponent strategy may be only 
effective if the actor anticipates a future interaction with the same opponent. In line with 
this assumption, the discontinuity effect was reduced when actors expected multiple 
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interaction trials compared to a single trial (Schopler et al., 2001), and when actors were 
explicitly requested to consider future consequences of their choices (Wolf et al., 2009).  
Second, many studies on interindividual-intergroup discontinuity allowed for 
communication between opponents prior to decision-making (interindividual or 
intergroup discussion respectively). The meta-analysis by Wildschut and colleagues 
(2003) showed that the effect is larger if this communication is unconstrained relative to 
constrained cooperative communication, for instance via confederates’ cooperative 
intent through written hand notes or telephone (e.g., Lodewijkx, Wildschut, Syroit, 
Visser, & Rabbie, 1999). Individual opponents may “benefit” more from 
communication than opposing groups (e.g., by increasing trust among opponents), 
intensifying the behavioral difference between both interaction conditions. However, if 
communication is rather indirect and constrained (e.g., communication via chat), trust 
building among individual actors may be less effective, leading to a decreased 
discontinuity effect by means of decreased interindividual cooperation (see e.g., Brosig, 
Weimann, & Ockenfels, 2003; Wichman, 1970 on the role of different kinds of 
communication and trust building)  
Third, the discontinuity effect theoretically applies to all mixed-motive 
situations with a value of correspondence that ranges from zero down to, but not 
including -1.00 (Schopler et al., 2001; Wolf et al., 2008). Correspondence of outcomes 
is the correlation of opponents’ outcomes, indicating how variations of one actor’s 
outcomes can be related to changes in the other actor’s outcomes (Kelley & Thibaut, 
1978; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959). Therefore, it is an index of conflict of interest. If 
opponents’ outcomes are positively related, there is in fact no conflict of interest and 
both individual and group actors should cooperate to maximize personal and joint 
outcomes. Supporting this assumption, there was no discontinuity effect found for the 
battle of the sexes matrix, which has a strong positive level of correspondence (i.e., r = 
.80; Wolf et al., 2008). In the case of perfect noncorrespondence of outcomes (r = -
1.00), the game turns into a zero-sum situation. Here, no choice can involve cooperative 
intent because there is no one choice that benefits both players. Therefore, one would 
not expect behavioral differences between interindividual and intergroup interactions, 
and in turn, no discontinuity effect.  
Fourth, interindividual-intergroup discontinuity is larger in situations with an 
interrelationship of group members’ personal decisions and joint group’s outcomes, 
which has been called procedural interdependence (Insko et al., 1994; Wildschut et al., 
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2001). Procedural interdependence may be characterized by a required consensus to 
reach a group decision (often through an intragroup discussion) or (positive) 
interdependence of group members’ outcomes. 
Finally, recent studies have shown that particularly actors high in dispositional 
guilt proneness are those who defect in intergroup interactions (T. R. Cohen, Montoya, 
& Insko, 2006; Insko et al., 2005; Pinter et al., 2007). It has been argued that high-guilt-
prone group members adhere to group morality by an increased concern to maximize 
the ingroup’s relative standing to an outgroup, compared to low-guilt-prone group 
members (see also two moralities paradox, Wildschut & Insko, 2006). 
In sum, there is evidence for a descriptively large discontinuity effect when the 
opponent strategy is unconstrained or constrained-cooperative, when there is the 
possibility for unconstrained communication between opponents, when the index of 
correspondence is negative (i.e., noncorrespondence of outcomes), when group 
members are procedural interdependent, and when actors’ guilt proneness is high. 
Although these moderators may establish some understanding on the emergence of the 
interindividual-intergroup discontinuity, however, at the best they provide indirect 
evidence for the underlying psychological mechanisms that might account for the effect. 
Therefore, the next section summarizes explanations that have been offered to account 
for the interindividual-intergroup discontinuity effect. 
 
1.2.2  Explanations of interindividual-intergroup discontinuity 
 
Research has offered several explanations why intergroup relations are less 
cooperative than interindividual relations. Wildschut and Insko (2007) distinguished 
between two general perspectives of explanations for the interindividual-intergroup 
discontinuity effect: the fear and greed perspective and the group decision-making 
perspective. In the following, these general perspectives of explanations are 
summarized and each explanation for interindividual-intergroup discontinuity is shortly 
described.  
The fear and greed perspective encompasses a family of different explanations 
that assume greater fear of receiving the lowest possible outcome or greater greed 
associated with receiving the highest possible outcome in intergroup interactions 
compared to interindividual interactions. Fear can relate either to losing rewards per se 
(absolute) or to losing the competition with the opponent(s) (relative). Greed can also 
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operate in absolute or relative terms. In interdependence theory (Kelley & Thibaut, 
1978), the motivation to maximize absolute outcomes has been labeled max own and the 
motivation to maximize relative outcomes max rel, respectively.3 The different 
explanations comprised in this perspective are: (1) schema-based distrust, (2) 
identifiability, (3) social support, (4) ingroup-favoring norm, and (5) altruistic 
rationalization.  
First, it has been shown that there may be more fear involved in intergroup 
interactions relative to interindividual interactions because the anticipation of an 
interaction with another group activates negative cognitive and affective responses, 
perceiving other groups as untrustworthy and hostile (schema-based distrust or fear 
explanation; e.g., Wildschut, Insko, & Pinter, 2004). This is the only explanation that 
centers on the greater fear in intergroup relative to interindividual relations. Moreover, 
interacting groups may also be greedier than interacting individuals for several reasons. 
For instance, second, actors are less identifiable for their defective behavior in an 
anonymous intergroup context, which provides a “shield of anonymity” allowing group 
members to avoid personal responsibility for a defective choice (identifiability 
explanation; Schopler, Insko, Drigotas, & Wieselquist, 1995). Third, members of the 
same group may provide mutual social support for self-interested behavior. Social 
support by ingroup members for pursuing a self-interested strategy can reduce 
normative constraints of fairness and equality (social support for shared self-interest 
explanation; e.g., Wildschut, Insko, & L. Gaertner, 2002). Fourth, group membership 
might imply normative pressure to act in favor of the ingroup. This may be another 
source of defective intergroup behavior that stands in contrast to fairness and equality 
(ingroup-favoring norm explanation; e.g., Wildschut et al., 2002). Finally, group 
members may rationalize their defective behavior as being in the interest of their own 
group (altruistic rationalization explanation; Insko, Pinkley, Hoyle, et al., 1987). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Defective behavior in mixed-motive situations may be motivated either by max own or by max rel (or 
by both). In the discontinuity effect literature defective behavior is often denoted as competition, 
irrespective of its underlying motivation. However, from an economical perspective there exists a clear 
distinction between selfish behavior and competitive behavior (e.g., Fehr & Fischbacher, 2002). Whereas 
the former one is exclusively motivated by material self-interest, the latter one takes also other-regarding 
social preferences into account (i.e., spiteful or envious preferences). In the following, therefore, non-
cooperative behavior in mixed-motive situations is denoted as defection in general, and as competition in 
particular if it is motivated by max rel. 
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In contrast to the fear and greed perspective, the group decision-making 
perspective encompasses explanations that share the assumption that the intragroup 
discussion prior to decision-making facilitates rational comprehension of the mixed-
motive situation, and that this rational insight might play an important role in producing 
the discontinuity effect. The four perspectives comprised in this perspective are: (1) 
backward induction, (2) group polarization, (3) reciprocity, and (4) cautious 
reciprocation. First, it is in the nature of mixed-motive situations that “rational” actors, 
who are purely self-interested (maximizing their own absolute outcomes), should 
always defect. The logic of backward induction, which is the process of reasoning 
backwards in time, dictates non-cooperative behavior even in sequential interactions, as 
rational actors would anticipate the actions of equally self-interested opponents (Von 
Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944). However, the complex structure of mixed-motive 
games makes it difficult to identify the rational solution. Due to intragroup discussion, 
group members are less prone to making mistakes in finding the rational solution than 
are individual decision-makers because they can pool their cognitive recourses, leading 
to an increased discontinuity effect (backward induction explanation; e.g., Bornstein et 
al., 2004). Second, the intragroup discussion may also strengthen individuals’ dominant 
behavioral inclination, for instance by exchange of persuasive arguments (group 
polarization explanation; Meier & Hinsz, 2004). Third, it has been argued that because 
of group members’ superior comprehension of the game structure through intragroup 
discussion, they are more likely to reciprocate the cooperative or defective behavior of 
the opponents in an attempt to maximize long-term outcomes (reciprocity explanation; 
e.g., Rabbie, 1998). Finally, the reciprocity explanation has been embedded in a broader 
theoretical framework, arguing that group members’ (rational) strategy to reciprocate 
opponents’ actions might only work properly if the opponents’ actions are predictable. 
Otherwise, intergroup interactions might be rather defective than interindividual 
interactions as the mechanisms assumed by the fear and greed perspective are at work 
(cautious reciprocation explanation; e.g., Lodewijkx, Rabbie, & Visser, 2006).  
 
1.2.3  Status quo 
 
Interindividual-intergroup discontinuity is an important and robust phenomenon. 
As it has turned out, the explanation of interindividual-intergroup discontinuity is 
anything but simple. Even though the effect itself is straightforward, the overview 
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shows that there is no shortage of explanations why intergroup relations are less 
cooperative than interindividual relations. Wildschut and Insko (2007) concluded that 
“the fear and greed perspective was found to be more consistent with the empirical 
record than a group decision-making perspective” (p. 203).  
One reason for the conclusion is that some studies have found a significant 
discontinuity effect even in the absence of intragroup discussions prior to intergroup 
interaction (Pinter et al., 2007; Wildschut, Insko, & Pinter, 2007). This raises doubts 
that the processes assumed by the group decision-making perspective are necessary to 
produce the discontinuity effect, however, it does not mean that intragroup discussion 
might not enhance intergroup defection.  
Another reason is that the fear and greed perspective is very consistent with the 
identified moderators of interindividual-intergroup discontinuity: opponent strategy, 
communication between opponents, conflict of interest, procedural interdependence 
between group members, and dispositional guilt proneness. Reciprocal opponent 
strategies always respond to cooperation in kind, which reduces distrust and fear, as 
well as the fact that defection begets a defective opponent response weakens or removes 
greed. Communication between opponents may be less credible and persuasive for 
group actors than for individual actors because intergroup relations involve more 
distrust/fear. And even when the communication of cooperative intent is perceived as 
credible, anonymity and social support for shared self-interest should make groups more 
likely to exploit the opponent than individuals. If the conflict of interest between 
opponents increases through a negative index of correspondence, the advantages of 
mutual cooperation decline and both fear and greed should increase. Procedural 
interdependence provides anonymity for group members and may easily activate 
schema-based distrust among opponents. Last but not least, guilt proneness motivates 
conformity to moral norms and concerns for close others (Baumeister, Stillwell, & 
Heatherton, 1994). If an intergroup conflict is salient, actors high in guilt proneness 
should be inclined to follow a greedy ingroup-favoring norm. In sum, explanations for 
the interindividual-intergroup discontinuity effect comprised by the fear and greed 
perspective have not only good empirical evidence but also are consistent with known 
moderators of the effect.  
In the literature on interindividual-intergroup discontinuity, differences between 
individuals and groups are predominantly characterized by structural differences of the 
interaction situation, treating actors either as independent or as interdependent (mostly 
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procedurally interdependent). However, research on group processes and intergroup 
relations has offered several perspectives of individual vs. group behavior. The 
following section introduces these different approaches of group formation.  
 
1.3  TWO PERSPECTIVES OF GROUP FORMATION 
 
To fully understand interindividual-intergroup discontinuity it is necessary to 
understand what actually characterizes intergroup interactions in contrast to 
interindividual interactions. However, this characterization starts with the obstacle of 
diverse definitions of the concept group. There are two approaches of group formation 
that can be distinguished: the interdependence-based and the identity-based group 
formation approach (Wilder & Simon, 1998).  
As Campbell (1958) already pointed out, to define what actually is and what is 
not a social group is not a trivial task. Whereas the evaluation of most non-organic and 
biological objects to entities is based on “hard” physical criteria (e.g., shape, weight, 
color), social aggregates are fuzzier and less discrete. Entitativity is the extent to which 
a group is perceived as being a coherent unit in which the group members are bonded 
together in some fashion (e.g., Brewer & Harasty, 1996; Campbell, 1958). It is therefore 
an index for perceived “groupness”. According to Campbell (1958), entitativity of 
social aggregates has “to be diagnosed or confirmed by common fate and similarity 
coefficients among responses” (Campbell, 1958, p. 24; italics added). Other authors 
highlighted the importance of only one of both factors for the perception of social 
groups – common fate or similarity. Some researchers have seen groups as social 
entities with a character of mutual influence. For instance, Lewin (1948) has argued “it 
is not similarity or dissimilarity of individuals that constitutes a group, but rather the 
interdependence of fate” (Lewin, 1948, p. 165). According to this interdependence-
based approach, the fact that individuals “are in the same boat” (Rupert Brown, 1988, p. 
28) makes them a group. In contrast, according to the identity-based approach of group 
formation, groups are seen as cognitive and affective representations of social entities. 
An aggregate of individuals becomes a social group if at least two individuals define 
themselves as members of a group and when its existence is recognized by others (e.g., 
Tajfel, 1981; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). A central characteristic of these group 
representations is that perceived similarities between members of the same group 
exceed perceived similarities between members of different groups (meta-contrast 
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ratio; e.g., Campbell, 1958; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). 
According to this perspective, group members have a salient social identity whereas 
individuals have a salient personal identity. Both approaches – the interdependence-
based and the identity-based perspective – imply that behavior shown by individuals 
might be interpreted as an expression of intergroup behavior if the actors either share a 
common fate with other individuals (interdependence-based approach; e.g., Lewin, 
1948), or if they self-categorize as members of different social groups and their social 
identities become salient (identity-based approach; e.g., Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner 
et al., 1987). Imagine for instance a peace treaty negotiation of two politicians who 
represent the interests of different countries. This interaction could be viewed as 
intergroup interaction – albeit there are individual opponents – because they share the 
outcomes with the citizens of their country (interdependence-based view; either they 
live altogether in peace or carry on suffering from war) and due to the definition of 
themselves and the recognition by others as citizens of different countries (identity-
based view). As it becomes clear in this example, interdependence of fate and salience 
of a social identity often occur together. However, it is also obvious that they represent 
different structural characteristics of groupness. In fact, research by Lickel and 
colleagues (e.g., Lickel, Hamilton, & Sherman, 2001; Lickel et al., 2000) indicates that 
group entitativity may be composed by different group properties and that these 
properties result in several clusters of group types: intimacy groups (e.g., family, 
friends), task groups (e.g., work team, jury), social categories (e.g., women, Blacks), 
and loose associations (e.g., people in a line at a bank). However, as noted by Lickel, 
Hamilton, and Sherman (2001) there is lack of research on differing behavioral 
tendencies with regard to how group entitativity is formed:  
 
[…] relatively little research has examined the way in which intragroup and intergroup 
phenomena are influenced by the type of groups that is involved. For example, consider the issue 
of intergroup conflict. […] However, we are aware of no research that has systematically 
investigated the extent to which conflict between groups occurs because of the same reasons, or 
through the same process, when the two groups that are engaged in the conflict are of a distinct 
type. (p. 137) 
 
The present work aims at closing this gap by investigating intergroup 
interactions either between interdependent actors (interdependence-based group 
formation), between similar actors with regard to a social category (identity-based 
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group formation), or both, compared to interindividual interactions (independent actors 
with a salient personal identity) in mixed-motive situations. The following section 
presents research questions and hypotheses of the present research.  
 
1.4  THE PRESENT RESEARCH 
 
What is the unique role of actors’ interdependence and actors’ social identity 
salience for the interindividual-intergroup discontinuity effect? Or put it in another way: 
Is it group members’ interdependence of fate, their salience of social identity, or both 
that makes them less cooperative than individual actors in the context of mixed motive 
situations? Previous research disregarded the distinctive value of interdependence- and 
identity-based group formation for the emergence of interindividual-intergroup 
discontinuity. The classical comparison involves a one-factorial contrast between 
interindividual (1 : 1) and intergroup (3 : 3) interactions. On the one hand, actors in the 
intergroup interaction condition share a common fate by reaching a joint decision and 
sharing its outcomes (e.g., Wildschut et al., 2001). This may be a source of 
interdependence-based entitativity in intergroup interactions. On the other hand, 
intragroup and intergroup discussions strengthen actors representation and identification 
as a group member (e.g., Bornstein, Mingelgrin, & Rutte, 1996; Dawes, McTavish, & 
Shaklee, 1977; Sally, 1995). This may be a source of identity-based entitativity in 
intergroup interactions. Clearly, intergroup interactions in the classical discontinuity 
effect paradigm involve group members who are interdependent and have a salient 
social identity. The aim of the present work is to investigate the role of both types of 
group formation – which have been confounded in previous studies – for 
interindividual-intergroup discontinuity independently and orthogonally. With this 
approach it is possible to answer whether the discontinuity effect is rather a function of 
actors’ interdependence (independent vs. interdependent), actors’ identity (personal vs. 
social), or both. Therefore, with regard to the present research, the classical one-
factorial, interindividual-versus-intergroup interaction distinction transforms to a two-
factorial, independent-versus-interdependent actors and personal-versus-social identity 
distinction (see Table 2). 
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Table 2. Two-factorial distinction of the interindividual-intergroup discontinuity effect  
Interdependence-based group formation approach Identity-based group 
formation approach 
Independent actors Interdependent actors 
Personal identity 
Independent actors with 
personal identity salience 
Interdependent actors with 
personal identity salience 
Social identity 
Independent actors with 
social identity salience 
Interdependent actors with 
social identity salience 
Note. The classical one-factorial, interindividual-versus-intergroup interaction distinction is nested in 
the two-factorial distinction, depicted in gray 
 
Below I elaborate the state of knowledge regarding differences in mixed-motive 
game behavior as a function of actors’ independence vs. interdependence, and actors’ 
salient personal vs. social identity. 
 
1.4.1  Actors’ independence vs. interdependence 
 
The central characteristic of group members’ interdependence is that they share 
some kind of common fate. This interrelationship of group members’ personal decisions 
has two components: a required consensus to reach a joint group decision and a positive 
interdependence between group members’ outcomes (both representing procedural 
interdependence, see Insko et al., 1994; Wildschut et al., 2001, 2003). A consensus rule 
is typically applied through a majority decision rule. For instance, if two group 
members vote for defection and one group member votes for cooperation, a majority 
decision rule would yield a defective group decision. If the interaction is structurally 
symmetric and both opponent sides have to reach a single decision, a consensus rule 
also implies a single outcome shared by all members of the same group. Therefore, a 
consensus rule always entails outcome interdependence between group members but not 
vice versa. Outcome interdependence between group members is the positive 
correlation of their earnings. In the domain of interindividual-intergroup discontinuity, 
outcome interdependence between group members is maximal positively correlated (r = 
1.00), resulting in a common fate of group members. In contrast, outcomes between 
opponents are negatively correlated (0 > r > -1.00), creating a conflict of interest (e.g., 
Wolf et al., 2008). 
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From the fear and greed perspective on interindividual-intergroup discontinuity 
(Wildschut & Insko, 2007) both components – required consensus and outcome 
interdependence – might be sources of actors’ decreased cooperativeness, creating 
interindividual-intergroup discontinuity. One may argue that actors who have to reach a 
joint decision are less identifiable (e.g., Schopler et al., 1995). If actors jointly follow a 
greedy strategy, opponents cannot attribute personal responsibility to only one 
individual actor. In turn, this shield of anonymity through a group consensus rule may 
be easily anticipated by opponents and activates schema-based distrust (e.g., Wildschut 
et al., 2004). Furthermore, even merely outcome interdependent actors who make 
individual decisions that are not “condensed” to a joint group decision might be less 
cooperative than outcome independent actors because their common fate activates an 
ingroup-favoring norm (e.g., Wildschut et al., 2002). If the own decision affects the 
decision-maker’s own outcome as well as the ingroup members’ outcomes, defection 
can be attributed to the maximization of the group’s absolute or relative earnings and 
not only to the maximization of actors’ own absolute or relative earnings. This might 
create normative pressure to decide in the ingroup’s interest (i.e., to defect). In sum, 
both components of procedural interdependence – required consensus to reach a joint 
group decision and mere interdependence of group members’ outcomes – might be 
sufficient to produce a behavioral difference between independent and interdependent 
actors, and therefore account for the moderating role of procedural interdependence on 
the interindividual-intergroup discontinuity effect (Wildschut et al., 2003). 
Little research examined either explicitly or implicitly whether actors’ 
interdependence might be a necessary prerequisite for the discontinuity effect. On the 
one hand, there are findings suggesting that a positive interdependence between actors 
decreases their cooperativeness in interaction with another group of interdependent 
actors relatively to independent opponents, but only if group members had to reach a 
joint decision and not when they were just merely outcome interdependent (Insko, 
Pinkley, Harring, et al., 1987; Insko et al., 1988). On the other hand, it has been found 
that even in the absence of a consensus rule outcome interdependent group members 
were less cooperative in n-person generalizations of the prisoner’s dilemma game 
(intergroup prisoner’s dilemma and intergroup public goods; Insko et al., 1994), or 
when outcome interdependent group members knew the decision-makers’ choice 
(accountable leader; Pinter et al., 2007).  
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Altogether, there are theoretical arguments why actors’ independence vs. 
interdependence in mixed-motive situations might be a source of interindividual-
intergroup discontinuity. However, empirical findings whether mere outcome 
interdependence is sufficient to decrease actors’ cooperativeness, or whether it requires 
in addition a consensus among actors are mixed. Moreover, most of these studies 
involved the possibility for intragroup and intergroup discussions, and instructions 
differed considerably between conditions regarding the framing of the interaction and 
its opponents as individuals or groups. Therefore, it is difficult to conclude from 
previous research that interdependence itself is sufficient to account for interindividual-
intergroup discontinuity because processes of identity salience as proposed by the 
identity-based perspective of group formation might also – at least partially – account 
for previous findings. The next section deals with these identity processes and 
explicates how they might play a role for the emergence of the discontinuity effect. 
 
1.4.2  Personal vs. social identity salience 
 
The idea that social identity processes might be an important factor to 
understand interindividual-intergroup discontinuity is based on experimental findings 
by Henri Tajfel and colleagues that stimulated research on intergroup relations and led 
to the formulations of social identity theory (SIT; Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986) and 
self-categorization theory (SCT; Turner et al., 1987). Whereas SIT exposes 
motivational aspects of intergroup behavior, SCT mainly focuses on cognitive 
mechanisms of intragroup processes. 4  
According to the social identity perspective of group formation and intergroup 
behavior (e.g., Hogg, Abrams, Otten, & Hinkle, 2004; Hornsey, 2008), a person’s self-
concept encompasses a personal identity and a social identity. A person’s personal 
identity is based on idiosyncratic characteristics that are not shared with other people – 
a self-construal in terms of the distinction I and You. Social identity derives from a 
person’s representation as a group member and the subjective meaning associated with 
this knowledge. People of the same social group identify themselves in the same way, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 There are several variations and extensions to the classical perspective of SIT and SCT (e.g, optimal 
distinctiveness theory, Brewer, 1991; intergroup emotions theory, Mackie & Smith, 1998). However, 
these theoretical developments share the basic ideas of an identity-based group formation. As this review 
aims to give a general overview of this perspective of group formation and its implications for 
interindividual-intergroup discontinuity, they are not detailed here. 
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have the same definition of what attributes they share, and how they relate to and differ 
from other groups.5 People cognitively represent groups in terms of prototypes. These 
prototypes are fuzzy sets of interrelated attributes that capture similarities within groups 
and differences between groups according to the principle of meta-contrast. From a 
social identity perspective, group membership is a collective self-construal in terms of 
the distinction We and They. In a given situation only one identity is psychologically 
real – the salient basis of self-construal and social perception (e.g., Oakes & Turner, 
1986).  
One of the main statements of the social identity approach is that people with a 
salient social identity are prone to favor their own group over outgroups (ingroup bias). 
As proposed by SIT, people strive for a positive distinctiveness – a positive image of 
their own group relative to other groups. This hypothesis rests on the assumption that 
self-enhancement and self-esteem is one of the most basic human motives (see 
Sedikides & Strube, 1997 for a detailed argumentation). Ingroup-favoring behavior may 
therefore be in the pursuit of bolstering self-identity through the relative advantage for 
the own group. However, the self-esteem hypothesis within SIT is one of the most 
controversial parts of the theory (for an overview see Rupert Brown, 2000). It has been 
questioned whether ingroup-favoring behavior is merely based on people’s motivation 
to boost their self-esteem. Hogg (2000) proposed an alternative explanation for ingroup 
bias, arguing that people identify with and act in favor of their own group just to reduce 
personal uncertainty about their social world and their place within it. Accordingly, the 
achievement of certainty about oneself and one’s social environment is a basic human 
motive and the behavior in accordance with the interest of one’s own groups fulfills this 
need. 
There is a considerable amount of experimental research supporting the identity-
based view of group formation and its proposed consequences. It has been shown that 
the creation of groups on the basis of ostensible differences (minimal group paradigm; 
e.g., responses to an irrelevant preference or judgmental task) is enough to make 
peoples’ social identity salient and produce an ingroup bias (e.g., allocation of more 
points to an unknown ingroup member than to an unknown outgroup member; for 
reviews see Brewer, 1979; Diehl, 1990). In fact, there was some evidence that 
participants gave absolutely less points to either group if it allowed them to positively 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 According to SCT, there is also a third level of categorization: the superordinate category of the self as a 
human being, often labeled as human identity or collective identity. 
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maximize the relative difference of their ingroup to the outgroup (max rel instead of 
max own). Using the terms of Messick and Sentis (1985), under conditions of social 
identity salience the social utility (i.e., payment for ingroup member relative to 
outgroup member) becomes more relevant than nonsocial utility (i.e., absolute payment 
for ingroup member). Importantly, this ingroup bias has been reported to occur even in 
the absence of (objective) interdependence between group members, providing evidence 
that mere categorization can account for intergroup competition (e.g., Billig & Tajfel, 
1973; Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971). To summarize this perspective of group 
formation and its evidence with the words of Hornsey (2008): “The group identity not 
only describes what it is to be a group member, but also prescribes what kinds of 
attitudes, emotions and behaviours are appropriate in a given context.” (p. 209). 
But how does actors’ identity salience relate to the interindividual-intergroup 
discontinuity effect? It seems plausible to assume that actors in the classical 
interindividual interaction condition have a salient personal identity, as this condition 
involves an interaction of two unique persons (I vs. You). In the classical intergroup 
interaction condition, however, actors should have a salient social identity, constituted 
by a salient categorical distinction and strengthened by intragroup discussion (Sally, 
1995; Samuelson & Watrous-Rodriguez, 2010), the presence and conflict of interest 
with a competing outgroup (e.g., Bornstein, 1992; Bornstein & Ben-Yossef, 1994), but 
also due to their common fate with other ingroup members (e.g., Turner & Bourhis, 
1996),6 all leading to a self-construed distinction of We vs. They. Research has shown 
that persons’ concern to act in the interest of a group in mixed-motive situations 
increases if actors categorize themselves as members of the same group (e.g., De 
Cremer, Van Knippenberg, Van Dijk, & Van Leeuwen, 2008), especially if the 
ingroup’s welfare corresponds to individual’s welfare (Wit & Kerr, 2002). If there is a 
conflict of interest between the own group and another group – as in the discontinuity 
effect paradigm – acting in the interest of one’s own group means defecting in 
interaction with the opponent group. In sum, first, one may agree that there might be a 
difference in identity salience between the interindividual (salient personal identity) and 
intergroup interaction condition (salient social identity) of the typical experimental 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Perceptions of interdependence or common fate are of importance in group behavior, but can be seen as 
part of a wider social identity mechanism. People may use information such as interdependence to 
construct social categories. Perceived interdependence may therefore be both a possible cause and effect 
of psychological group formation (entitativity) through social identity salience (see also Turner, 1999). 
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design observing the discontinuity effect. Second, according to the identity-based 
perspective of intergroup behavior, actors with a salient social identity are motivated to 
positively maximize the difference relative to outgroup opponents. Therefore, they are 
rather prone to compete than to cooperate in interaction with outgroup members. 
However, from this one cannot imply that actors with a salient social identity defect 
more than actors with a salient personal identity, leading to interindividual-intergroup 
discontinuity. Some authors have argued that both individual actors and group members 
should receive positive bolstering of self-esteem from doing better than the opponent(s), 
and should therefore also be equally defective (Drigotas, Insko, & Schopler, 1998; 
Insko & Schopler, 1987; Insko et al., 1992). In their view, “[t]he theory is not so much 
implausible as incomplete” (Drigotas et al., 1998, p. 182) to explain interindividual-
intergroup discontinuity. However, as stated earlier, it might not be the motivation to 
bolster self-esteem but rather the motivation to reduce subjective uncertainty of the 
social situation that leads to an ingroup bias (e.g., Hogg, 2000). In other words, an 
uncertain environment as present in mixed-motive situations (e.g., regarding outcomes, 
other persons’ choices and the adequate own choice) might motivate ingroup-favoring 
behavior of persons with a salient social identity, leading to intergroup defection. In 
contrast, subjective uncertainty among persons with a salient personal identity has been 
shown to strengthen norms of fairness and equality, leading to interindividual 
cooperation (for reviews see Van Dijk & De Cremer, 2006; Van Dijk, Wit, Wilke, & de 
Kwaadsteniet, 2010). Clearly, to expect behavioral differences between people with a 
salient personal vs. social identity does not require the self-esteem hypothesis within 
SIT.  
There is also indirect evidence from the literature on interindividual-intergroup 
discontinuity that identity salience might play an important role for the emergence of 
the effect. Mediation analyses have shown that distrust, the motivation to maximize 
absolute outcomes (max own), and the motivation to maximize relative outcomes (max 
rel) may serve as mediators for the discontinuity effect (e.g., Insko et al., 2005; Pinter et 
al., 2007; Wildschut et al., 2001, 2002). According to the identity-based perspective, 
max rel should particularly account for intergroup defection. Furthermore, not all of the 
proposed explanations summarized by the fear and greed perspective on interindividual-
intergroup discontinuity require factual interdependence between group members, but 
may also predict a behavioral difference between actors with a salient personal vs. 
social identity: the schema-based distrust or fear explanation, the ingroup-favoring 
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norm explanation, and the altruistic rationalization explanation (see subchapter 1.2.2). 
The mechanisms proposed by these explanations may be triggered merely by actors’ 
differences in identity salience. I should also mention one study that investigated the 
role of actors’ social categorization on the discontinuity effect (Insko et al., 2005, Study 
2). Here, participants were assigned either to an interindividual (1 : 1) or intergroup 
interaction (3 : 3) condition like in previous research. However, opponents were not 
assigned randomly but according to a minimal group procedure (preference for 
paintings from the artists Klee vs. Kandinsky; see also Tajfel et al., 1971). Participants 
interacted either with an ingroup opponent (same artist preference) or with an outgroup 
opponent (different artist preference) on a PDG-alt matrix, which offers a discrete 
choice between three alternatives: cooperation, withdrawal, and defection.7 It was found 
that cooperation was greater between individuals than between groups, as well as 
between ingroup opponents than between outgroup opponents. However, looking only 
on defection, there was a significant interaction type × opponent type interaction, 
indicating that groups defected more than individuals, particularly with ingroup rather 
than outgroup opponents. The effects on cooperation are in line with the 
interdependence-based and identity-based perspective on interindividual-intergroup 
discontinuity. The interaction effect on defection is somewhat puzzling. The authors 
interpreted this finding as a tendency of groups to exploit the expectation that 
opponents’ will cooperate. However, there are two reasons why I think that this study 
does not help to uncover the mere effects of actors’ interdependence and identity 
salience on interindividual-intergroup discontinuity. First, as opponents in all conditions 
were assigned according to the minimal group procedure, the study did not manipulate 
personal vs. social identity salience but rather ingroup vs. outgroup interactions under 
social identity salience. Second, the interaction situation in the intergroup 
interaction/ingroup opponent condition was framed as an intergroup interaction, and 
this might have been further strengthened by team members’ positive interdependence 
and intragroup discussions prior to decision-making. Therefore, the tendency for groups 
to defect more in interaction with ingroup opponents compared to individual actors 
might be attributed to a subgrouping process (e.g., Richards & Hewstone, 2001), which 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Withdrawal is a “safe” option that provides a payoff, which is lower than the payoff for mutual 
cooperation as well as the payoff for sole defection, but higher than the payoff for sole cooperation as 
well as the payoff for mutual defection. It has been argued that actors should choose this option if they 
are fearful regarding the opponent choice (e.g., Schopler, Insko, Drigotas, & Graetz, 1993). 
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could have undermined the originally implemented social categorization. Although 
these findings are interesting and provide a first step in the direction this dissertation is 
heading for, it cannot disentangle the independent effects of interdependence and 
identity salience on the interindividual-intergroup discontinuity effect. 
 
1.4.3  Summary 
 
Previous research on the interindividual-intergroup discontinuity effect treated 
groups as aggregates of interdependent actors. However, the classical experimental 
paradigm leaves also room for the interpretation that actors identity salience accounts 
(to some extent) for the effect. I presented different theoretical arguments as well as 
empirical evidence that suggest that both an interdependence-based as well as an 
identity-based group formation may be independently sufficient to produce 
interindividual-intergroup discontinuity. However, as both factors have been inherently 
confounded in most of previous research, it is not possible to give an answer whether 
actors’ independence vs. interdependence and actors’ salient personal vs. social identity 
are by themselves sufficient minimal conditions to create the discontinuity effect, or 
whether it is a joint function of both mechanisms. 
The following empirical studies aimed to provide a new experimental paradigm 
that allows disentangling both mechanisms and exploring their independent role for 
interindividual-intergroup discontinuity. 
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2.  EMPIRCIAL EVIDENCE 
 
2.1  STUDY 1 
 
The aim of the present study was to manipulate actors’ interdependence and 
identity salience orthogonally to each other, investigating their independent effects on 
the emergence of interindividual-intergroup discontinuity. 
As stated earlier, actors’ interdependence has two components: mere outcome 
interdependence and a consensus rule, the former one typically nested in the latter. To 
reiterate, the main interest of this thesis was to detect minimal conditions sufficient for a 
discontinuity effect. Thus, interdependence was manipulated by means of actors’ mere 
outcome interdependence. Participants were either assigned to teams of three actors that 
played against each other, with common outcomes for all actors of a team (3 : 3; 
outcome interdependence) or, in contrast, individual actors played against one another 
(1 : 1; outcome independence). 
To make actors’ social identity salient, individuals have to identify with a group 
that has some value for them (e.g., Tajfel, 1981). Therefore, social identity was made 
salient by means of a minimal group paradigm. Participants completed a judgment task, 
assessing their over- or underestimation of a shortly presented varying number of 
objects (e.g., Tajfel, 1970; Tajfel et al., 1971). According to the results of this task, 
opponents from opposing social groups were matched (overestimators : 
underestimators; independent and interdependent outcomes condition), whereas 
interdependent team members were from the same social group (all either over- or 
underestimators; only interdependent outcomes condition). Interactions and opponents 
were framed as intergroup interactions and groups respectively, irrespective of the 
outcome interdependence condition. In contrast, personal identity was made salient by 
making all kinds of assignments (opponents and interdependent actors) randomly. There 
was no reference to a group/intergroup context within the instructions to avoid a 
spontaneous activation of social identity, rather interactions and opponents were framed 
as interindividual interactions and individuals respectively.  
As both factors (outcome interdependence and identity salience) were 
manipulated independently of each other, there were four possible combinations: 
Outcome interdependence with social identity salience (3 : 3; actors were informed that 
their team consists of members of the same social group and the opponent team of 
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members of the opposing social group), outcome interdependence with personal identity 
salience (3 : 3; no reference to social group membership), outcome independence with 
social identity salience (1 : 1; actors were informed that their opponent is from the 
opposing social group), outcome independence with personal identity salience (1 : 1; no 
reference to social group membership). 
In order to prevent that a social identity emerged spontaneously between the 
actors of a team in the 3 : 3 condition, there was no intergroup discussions or contact 
between them (all actors remained seated individually at their computers during the 
experiment). Assignment of actors to teams and groups as well as opponent matching 
was completely anonymous to ensure that nobody knew who their team members or 
opponents were. 
In the following, I derive hypotheses regarding the differences in actors’ mixed-
motive game behavior between the four combinations of outcome interdependence and 
identity salience that were realized in the present experimental design. 
 
2.1.1  Hypotheses 
 
 The combination of outcome interdependence with social identity salience (3 : 3, 
team and opponent matching according to social group memberships) is similar to the 
intergroup interaction condition of a classical discontinuity paradigm (see subchapter 
1.4.2 for a detailed argumentation). In this condition, actors share a common fate and 
represent themselves and the other outcome interdependent individuals as members of 
the same social group. In contrast, the combination of independent outcomes with 
salient personal identity (1 : 1, random matching) corresponds to the interindividual 
interaction condition of a classical discontinuity paradigm – actors have to decide on 
their own and are affected only personally by the outcomes of the game. Thus, in line 
with previous research (e.g., Brewer & Kramer, 1986; Insko et al., 2005) I hypothesized 
that interactions between (social) groups of outcome interdependent actors with a salient 
social identity are less cooperative than interactions between outcome independent 
individuals with a salient personal identity, replicating the standard discontinuity effect. 
I predicted that this difference should obtain even in the absence of discussions between 
members of a group with outcome interdependent actors sharing a salient social identity 
(see also Pinter et al., 2007, Study 2). 
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Comparing the 3 : 3 condition (interdependent outcomes) with the 1 : 1 
condition (independent outcomes) yields a test for the “pure” effect of outcome 
interdependence. As reviewed earlier, although one may theoretically argue that actors’ 
mere outcome interdependence might be sufficient to decrease their cooperativeness in 
mixed-motive interactions, only a view studies have found a significant discontinuity 
effect under conditions of group members’ mere outcome interdependence (Insko et al., 
1994; Pinter et al., 2007; see subchapter 1.4.1 for a detailed description). However, the 
specific conditions of these studies were not realized in the current experiment (Insko et 
al., 1994: domain of n-person games; Pinter et al., 2007: outcome interdependent group 
members knew the choice of the decision-maker). Therefore, I assumed that mere 
outcome interdependence of actors alone would not be sufficient to decrease actors’ 
cooperativeness compared to interactions between actors who are outcome independent 
(see also Insko, Pinkley, Harring, et al., 1987; Insko et al., 1988). 
A comparison between the condition in which actors’ social identity was made 
salient by means of minimal group assignments (salient social identity) and the 
condition with random assignments (salient personal identity) allows testing the mere 
influence of identity salience on behavior in mixed-motive situations. As stated earlier, 
the identity-based perspective on group formation proposes that actors’ salient social 
identity is sufficient to motivate actors competitively maximizing the gain of their 
ingroup relative to the outgroups’ gain, even in the absence of interdependence between 
ingroup members (see subchapter 1.4.2 for a detailed argumentation).  
Thus, I predicted that actors’ salient social identity suffices to decrease 
cooperation with outgroup opponents compared to interactions between actors with a 
salient personal identity. 
 
2.1.2  Method 
 
Participants and experimental design 
 
 Participants were 98 students (53 men, 45 women) from various disciplines of 
the University of Jena. Age of participants ranged from 18 to 33 years (MD = 22). All 
participants received a show-up fee of 2.50 € and had the possibility to earn additionally 
up to 6 € (overall earnings of M = 5.50 €). I used a 2 (outcome interdependence: 
independent vs. interdependent) × 2 (identity salience: personal vs. social identity) 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE	   26 
between-subjects design. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the conditions. 
Respective cell sample sizes were 26 in the independent outcomes/social identity 
condition and 24 in each of the other three conditions.  
 
Procedure 
 
Participants subscribed via the online registration software ORSEE (Greiner, 
2004) for the experimental sessions, each consisting of 10 to 14 participants. 
Experimental sessions were run in a laboratory with separated individual PCs. On 
arrival, participants drew an index card to determine their cubicle number. The whole 
experiment was computer-mediated using the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) 
without actual contact between participants. Before the experiment started, the 
experimenter told participants that they would have real interactions with other 
participants via the computer without any form of communication prior to decision-
making, and that these interactions would determine their payoffs. In the social identity 
condition the experiment started with an adapted minimal group paradigm. Here, 
participants estimated in five trials the number of objects (“X”) that were presented on 
the screen (5 to 30 objects per screen, in each trial presented for 500ms). According to 
participants’ judgments, they were assigned either to the group of overestimators or 
underestimators, followed by four questions regarding their identification with the 
respective group.8 Subsequently, instructions provided detailed information about the 
interactive decision-making task (the words game, cooperation or competition were not 
used in the instructions). Participants received examples and had to pass several control 
questions before the experiment started in order to make sure that they understood the 
structure of the decision-making task properly. Next, participants in the independent 
outcomes condition were told that they would interact with another participant, who 
would be either randomly selected (personal identity condition) or who would be a 
member of the other social group regarding the results of the judgment task (social 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 The laboratory belongs to the School of Economics and Business Administration, which allows no 
deception procedures in experiments. In fact, the test measured over- or underestimation of participants’ 
judgments. Participants were assigned accordingly to the respective group. However, there were only five 
trials, which rendered the test unreliable but still face valid, leading in fact to a random group assignment. 
To make sure that half of the participants were assigned to each group, the software computed a median-
split of participants’ mean estimations in each session. There were no differences between the groups 
regarding group identification and mixed-motive game-behavior in all experiments. 
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identity condition; overestimator : underestimator). Participants in the interdependent 
outcomes condition were told about the interaction of two teams of three outcome 
interdependent actors each. Participants were either assigned randomly to the teams 
(personal identity condition) or according to their social group memberships (social 
identity condition; members of the own team were drawn from the same social group, 
and members of the other team were drawn from the other social group). In the 
interdependent outcomes condition it was further explained that team members would 
make their decisions individually and independently; however, one member of each 
team would be selected randomly and the decision would be paired with the decision of 
a randomly selected member of the other team. The payoffs resulting from this pairing 
would apply to all members of the respective team. Thus, the game was played 3 : 3 in 
the interdependent outcomes condition, with members of the same team having a 
common fate by being outcome interdependent (all members got the same payoff), 
whereas all participants in the independent outcomes condition (1 : 1) made decisions 
that only affected their personal and the opponent’s outcomes. Participants then made 
their decisions. Afterwards, they completed a short post-experimental questionnaire that 
assessed demographics. Finally, participants were informed about their payoff. 
Participants were separately called, paid, and dismissed by the experimenter. The whole 
experiment took about 20 to 30 minutes. 
 
Dependent variables 
 
Behavior in an UG. We used a one-shot ultimatum bargaining or ultimatum game (UG), 
which allows a continuous assessment of the actors’ tendency to cooperate or defect 
(see Güth, Schmittberger, & Schwarze, 1982 for a first experimental analysis). The 
main reason for using the UG was based on the continuous measurement of cooperative 
and defective behavioral tendencies, which might be more sensitive to small 
motivational differences compared to binary-choice matrix games like the prisoner’s 
dilemma game (Simpson, 2006). The UG involves two players: the proposer or 
allocator, and the responder or recipient. They receive a sum of monetary units by the 
experimenter (i.e., 100 ECUs, corresponding to a value of 6 €). Then, the proposer has 
to split the sum by proposing to take share x, so that the recipient receives 100 - x. If the 
recipient accepts the proposed division, both players get paid accordingly. However, if 
the recipient rejects the proposal, both players get paid nothing. Figure 1 illustrates the 
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extensive-form representation of an UG with two possible proposals (node 1), one that 
might be considered as a “fair” offer (F; 100 - x = 50), and one that might be considered 
as an “unfair” offer (U; 100 - x = 20). The recipient (node 2) may either accept (A) the 
offer, which would result in the respective distribution (50/50 or 80/20 respectively), or 
reject (R) the offer, which would result in an outcome of 0 for both proposer and 
recipient. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Extensive-form representation of a two proposal ultimatum game; The 
proposer (1) may either offer a fair (F) or unfair (U) amount to the recipient (2), who in 
turn can either accept (A) or reject (R) the proposal. Amounts of fair and unfair offers 
are  
 
Assuming that both players are individually “rational”, concerned only with 
maximizing their own absolute payoffs, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium would 
predict that the recipient accepts every proposal for which either x < 100 or x <= 100, 
because 1 ECU is better than nothing, and even an offer of 0 ECU makes the recipient 
indifferent between accepting and rejecting the offer.9 Anticipating that, it would be 
individually rational for the proposer to offer either the smallest positive amount to the 
recipient (x = 99, 100 - x = 1), or nothing. Proposing a small amount is generally 
interpreted as defective behavior (either selfish or competitive, or both), whereas 
proposing a large amount can be seen as cooperative behavior. Rejecting small offers 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Indifference is a common term in game theory that relates to a set of options with the same utility. In the 
present example, with regard to own outcomes, it does not make a difference whether the recipient 
accepts or rejects an offer of 100 - x = 0, as both would lead to an outcome of 0. It is often assumed that 
decisions are made randomly if decision-makers are indifferent regarding possible options. However, one 
may also argue that in the state of indifference social preferences become salient and actors are prone to 
make equitable decisions (i.e., to reject the offer). However, this discussion goes beyond the scope of the 
present work. 
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(100 - x <= 50) can be taken as an indicator of competitive (although “irrational”) 
behavior as only offers with 100 - x > 50 increase the positive outcome difference 
relative to the opponent, whereas accepting all possible offers increases the actor’s 
absolute outcome and can be interpreted as selfish behavior (e.g., Bornstein & Yaniv, 
1998). Clearly, the UG displays a mixed-motive situation that causes an internal conflict 
for the decision-maker. 
To increase the statistical test power, the UG was played using the strategy 
vector method (Selten, 1967): All participants first made their decision for a proposal, 
and then they decided on the minimum amount they would accept as recipient. The 
roles were assigned randomly at the end of the experiment (participants were informed 
about this procedure beforehand). Previous studies did not find significant behavioral 
differences when using this method with regard to choice behavior (e.g., Brandts & 
Charness, 2000; Güth, Huck, & Müller, 2001; Oxoby & McLeish, 2004). 
In contrast to the game-theoretic solution for individual (absolute) profit-
maximization, it has been found that individuals playing the UG tend to offer a sizeable 
amount (on average 40-50% of the sum) and proposals that fall below a certain limit get 
consistently rejected. These findings are robust across different populations and 
experimental procedures (for an overview see Camerer & Thaler, 1995). It has been 
suggested that these findings could be explained by a utility of fairness and the exigency 
to punish unfair offers (Ochs & Roth, 1989). 
To my knowledge, there is only one published paper that used the UG to 
compare interindividual and intergroup interactions. Bornstein and Yaniv (1998) found 
in two experiments a discontinuity effect for proposer decisions: Groups proposed 
significantly less to other groups than individuals did to other individuals. However, 
with regard to the recipient decisions, groups did not differ from individuals. Because 
proposing small amounts and accepting small amounts is in line with an economic 
perspective of absolute outcome maximization, the authors interpreted these findings in 
favor of the backward induction explanation (see subchapter 1.2.2). They have argued 
that group members become more rational actors than individuals through group 
discussions. 
 
Group identification. Participants in the social identity condition answered four items 
regarding their identification with the ingroup (either overestimators or underestimators 
according to the judgment task) using items by Doosje, Ellemers, and Spears (1995), for 
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instance “I feel attached to other students in the basic/advanced study period.” 
Participants answered the items on 7-point-scales, with 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = 
strongly agree (Cronbach’s α = .61). 
 
Analytic strategy 
 
 In contrast to most of previous research on interindividual-intergroup 
discontinuity where groups had to reach a joint decision, in the present study 
participants in all conditions made their decisions independently without 
communicating with the opponent(s) and/or the members of their own team. Therefore, 
the unit of analyses was the individual. 
 
2.1.3  Results 
 
Descriptive statistics 
 
The overall proposals ranged from 1 to 65 ECUs (MD = 37, M = 36.00, SD = 
10.65), minimum acceptance thresholds ranged from 0 to 50 EMUs (MD = 25, M = 
22.96, SD = 13.22), which is comparable to previous findings (e.g., Camerer & Thaler, 
1995).10 Proposals and minimum acceptance thresholds were positively correlated (r = 
.44, p < .001), indicating that participants, who made smaller proposals, were also 
willing to accept smaller proposals. 
Participants in the social identity condition showed a medium level of 
identification with the group they were assigned to (overestimators or underestimators; 
M = 3.49, SD = 1.07), indicating that the social category had some value for them and 
therefore, a successful manipulation of social identity salience. 
 
 
Behavior in the UG by experimental condition 
 
Mean values and standard deviations of proposer and recipient decision for each 
experimental condition are displayed in Table 3.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Three participants were excluded from the analyses because they stated that they already knew the UG 
from lectures or previous experiments at the end of the experiment. 
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Table 3. Mean values and standard deviations of UG-behavior by experimental 
condition  
Interdependent outcomes Independent outcomes 
UG role Social 
identity 
Personal 
identity 
Social 
identity 
Personal 
identity 
Proposer 32.39 
(9.40) 
37.77 
(11.55) 
34.04 
(11.20) 
39.96 
(9.19) 
Recipient 21.04 
(12.12) 
25.18 
(13.75) 
22.00 
(13.29) 
23.79 
(14.10) 
Note. Standard deviations in brackets 
 
In a first step, I investigated whether the standard discontinuity effect could be 
replicated with the present experimental design. Therefore, the planned contrast 
between the effect-coded interdependent outcomes/social identity condition (coded -1) 
and the independent outcomes/personal identity condition (coded 1) was computed, 
separately for proposer and recipient decisions (the remaining conditions were not 
included in the analysis). As expected, smaller offers were made by participants who 
acted in outcome interdependent teams with a salient social identity (M = 32.39, SD = 
9.40) than by participants who acted outcome independent with a salient personal 
identity (M = 39.96, SD = 9.19); F(1, 46) = 7.79, p = .008, ηp2 = .15. The finding 
indicates a significant discontinuity effect for proposer decisions. However, the two 
conditions did not differ regarding the recipient decisions, F(1, 46) < 1. 
To assess the separate and joint effects of outcome interdependence and identity 
salience on ultimatum game behavior, I conducted two 2 (outcome interdependence) × 
2 (identity salience) analyses of variance (ANOVA), one for proposer decisions and one 
for recipient decisions. A significant main effect of identity salience on proposer 
decisions revealed that participants in the social identity condition (Msocial = 33.27, SD = 
10.32) proposed smaller amounts than participants in the personal identity condition 
(Mpersonal = 38.91, SD = 10.33); F(1, 94) = 7.00, p = .010, ηp2 = .07. Neither the effect of 
outcome interdependence (Minterdependent = 35.02, SD = 10.74; Mindependent = 36.88, SD = 
10.61), nor the outcome interdependence × identity salience interaction reached 
significance, both F(1, 94) < 1. As hypothesized, the discontinuity effect for proposer 
decisions mainly reflects the influence of identity salience rather than of outcome 
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interdependence. An ANOVA with recipient decisions as dependent variable revealed 
no significant effects, all F(1, 94) < 1.5, p > .25. 
 
2.1.4  Discussion 
 
 Findings of Study 1 were in line with the prediction that social identity salience 
is sufficient to produce the discontinuity effect. Participants with a salient social identity 
who interacted outcome interdependently with two other ingroup members against three 
outcome interdependent outgroup members were less cooperative (i.e., made smaller 
proposals to the other group) than outcome independent participants with a salient 
personal identity who interacted with a randomly assigned opponent. Thus, I replicated 
the discontinuity effect in the absence of intragroup and intergroup discussions. In 
addition, no consensus was required to reach a group decision. Therefore, the present 
study provides further evidence for the robustness and generalization of the 
interindividual-intergroup discontinuity effect. 
Whereas mere salience of social identity was sufficient to decrease cooperation 
in interaction with outgroup members, actors’ positive outcome interdependence alone 
did not yield a decrease in cooperation. The latter null-effect is in line with previous 
studies (Insko, Pinkley, Harring, et al., 1987; Insko et al., 1988). The result is 
remarkable because both factors are inherently confounded in the classical discontinuity 
paradigm. Thus far, it has sometimes been doubted that social categorization alone is 
sufficient to create interindividual-intergroup discontinuity (Drigotas et al., 1998; Insko 
& Schopler, 1987; Schopler & Insko, 1992). However, the findings of Study 1 provide 
first evidence for the reduction of the interindividual-intergroup discontinuity effect to a 
mere effect of identity salience by controlling for outcome interdependence and 
excluding alternative mechanisms. For instance, differences in decision-making 
procedures of experimental conditions (e.g., intragroup or intergroup discussions prior 
to decision-making or decision-making by consensus only in intergroup interactions) 
that were typically present in previous experiments, cannot account for behavioral 
differences in the present study. 
 The discontinuity effect was obtained only in the proposer decisions but there 
was no significant difference among experimental conditions in the recipient decisions, 
replicating Bornstein and Yaniv’s (1998) finding. However, as there was no intragroup 
discussion prior to decision-making in the present experiment, the backward induction 
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explanation cannot account for this difference. A possible reason might be a reduced 
sensitivity of recipient decisions for differences between actors with a salient social and 
personal identity: Individual’s motivation to maximize one’s own absolute gain and the 
motivation to maximize the relative gain of one’s own group compared to the gains of 
the other group come into conflict here. According to social identity theory, social 
identity salience mainly affects actors’ motivation to maximize relative gains. As Tajfel 
and Turner (1979) wrote: 
 
There is also a good deal of evidence that, within the pattern of responding in terms of in-group 
favoritism, maximum difference (M.D.) is more important to the subjects than maximum in-
group profit (M.I.P.). Thus, they seem to be competing with the out-group, rather than following 
a strategy of simple economic gain for members of the in-group. (p. 39) 
 
In former studies using the minimal group paradigm, decision-makers self-
interest was explicitly excluded. In the present case, however, the motivation of not 
accepting a disadvantage of one’s own group (activating a tendency to reject “unfair” 
offers, see also Ochs & Roth, 1989) might be overridden by the decision-makers 
interest of earning as much money as possible, irrespective of what the actors of the 
other group get. By contrast, in the proposer decisions the motivation to increase the 
relative advantage of one’s group may easily influence decisions because it is 
compatible with self-interest (Wit & Kerr, 2002). Another possible explanation for the 
reduced sensitivity of the recipient decisions is that these decisions were always given 
after the proposer decisions had been made. Due to the positive correlation between the 
two decisions, making a competitive decision as a proposer might have negatively 
influenced the competitiveness of a subsequent recipient decision, thus counteracting 
the influence of our independent variables on recipient decisions. In any case, the 
current findings raise some doubts regarding the backward induction explanation, 
favored by Bornstein and Yaniv (1998). 
 A concern regarding the results of Study 1 may be that the encountered effects 
might partly be based on the continuous property of cooperation and competition as 
measured in the ultimatum game. One may question whether the effects replicate if 
participants are faced with a decision either to cooperate or to compete. It has been 
argued that such a binary-choice between cooperation and competition provides a more 
stringent test of behavioral tendencies than a continuous measure (Simpson, 2006). 
Moreover, previous research on the interindividual-intergroup discontinuity effect 
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primarily investigated mixed-motive situations with a binary-choice of 
cooperation/competition (mostly the PDG). Second, Study 1 did not contain a 
comparison of identity salience between the personal and social identity conditions as a 
check of the manipulation (in addition to the absolute measure of group identification 
that was applicable in the social identity condition only). Third, the test power of Study 
1 to detect a medium sized effect (f = .25; J. Cohen, 1988) was relatively small (1 - beta 
= .67),11 Therefore, it seemed advisable to replicate the null-effects of outcome 
interdependence and outcome interdependence × identity salience in a second study 
before definite conclusions regarding the influence of this factor on behavior in mixed-
motive situations can be drawn. 
 
2.2  STUDY 2 
 
To test the generalizability of the first study’s results across different mixed-
motive situations, I measured cooperative and defective behavior with a qualitative 
binary decision in a prisoner’s dilemma game (PDG; either to cooperate or to defect) in 
the present experiment. Earlier experiments found significant interindividual-intergroup 
discontinuity effects with various PDG-matrices (e.g., Insko et al., 1988, 2001, 2005; 
McCallum et al., 1985; Wildschut et al., 2001, 2002). However, in the PDG the two 
motivations for a defective choice – to maximize absolute and relative gain – are 
confounded, as they are confounded in the proposer decision of the UG. Therefore, to 
get a deeper insight into participants’ underlying motivation to cooperate or defect, I 
assessed several motivations that might affect mixed-motive game behavior via closed-
ended questions in a post-experimental questionnaire: maximization of absolute gain, 
maximization of relative gain, minimization of differences, maximization of joint 
outcomes, and distrust (see e.g., Kelley & Thibaut, 1978). Previous research 
demonstrated the importance of those motivations in predicting mixed-motive game 
behavior (e.g., Insko et al., 2005; Wildschut et al., 2001, 2002). 
Moreover, as a manipulation-check of the social identity manipulation, I also 
assessed the perceived similarity/dissimilarity to members of the own team and the 
opponent team in the interdependent outcomes condition. Following the meta-contrast 
principle, persons with a salient social identity should perceive greater similarities to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Post hoc power calculations were conducted with the program G*Power 3 (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & 
Lang, 2009). 
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members of their own team than to members of the opponent team compared to persons 
with a salient personal identity (e.g., Oakes & Turner, 1986; Turner et al., 1987). 
 
2.2.1  Hypotheses 
 
The aim was to replicate findings of Study 1 – (standard) discontinuity effect 
through a planned contrast between the interdependent outcomes/social identity 
condition and the independent outcomes/personal identity condition, and a main effect 
of identity salience – with a different, binary-choice mixed-motive situation. In 
addition, in line with the fear and greed perspective (Wildschut & Insko, 2007), I 
expected that persons’ lower willingness to cooperate in the social identity condition 
compared to the personal identity condition would be mediated by intensified greed 
and/or fear. More specifically, following social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 
1986), a salient social identity should particularly increase actors’ motivation to 
maximize the outcomes of their ingroup relative to the outcomes of the outgroup. 
Furthermore, I hypothesized that actors’ perceived relative similarity should account for 
motivational and behavioral differences between the personal and social identity 
condition. 
 
2.2.2  Method 
 
Participants and experimental design 
 
 Participants were 170 students (65 men, 105 women) from various disciplines of 
the University of Jena. Age of participants ranged from 18 to 29 years (MD = 20). All 
participants had the possibility to earn up to 7 € (overall earnings of M = 4.00 €). The 
experiment used a 2 (outcome interdependence: independent vs. interdependent) × 2 
(identity salience: personal vs. social identity) between-subjects design. Participants 
were randomly assigned to one of the conditions. Respective cell sample sizes were 24 
in the interdependent outcomes/social identity condition, 36 in the interdependent 
outcomes/personal identity condition, 54 in the independent outcomes/social identity 
condition, and 56 in the independent outcomes/personal identity condition (with 12-18  
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participants per experimental session).12 
 
Procedure 
 
 The procedure and manipulations of outcome interdependence and identity 
salience were the same as in Study 1. Because of the extension of the post-experimental 
questionnaire, the experiment took slightly longer (about 30 to 40 minutes). 
 
Dependent variables 
 
Behavior in a PDG. Participants played a one-shot prisoner’s dilemma game (PDG). 
This mixed-motive situation involves symmetric interactions between two opponents 
(individuals or teams). It was first framed as a 2 × 2 outcome matrix by Merrill Flood 
and Melvin Dresher in 1950 as part of RAND corporation’s studies on global nuclear 
conflict, later formalized by mathematician Albert W. Tucker with an anecdote about 
prisoners (Poundstone, 1993). In the PDG, each side can choose between C 
(cooperation, labeled X in the experiment) and D (defection, labeled Y), without 
knowing the choice of the opponent(s). The outcome for the two sides is determined by 
the combination of their respective choices. Following the game theoretic analysis of 
this game, it is “rational” for both sides to defect, because C is strictly dominated by D: 
u(C, C) < u(D, C) and u(C, D) < u(D, D), yet, cooperation is collectively more efficient: 
u(C, C) > u(D, D) and u(C, C) > [u(C, D) + u(D, C)]/2. Therefore, by defecting actors 
maximize both absolute and relative gain. Figure 2A displays the normal-form 
representation of a formalized PDG matrix with its payoffs: reward (R) for mutual 
cooperation, punishment (P) for mutual defection, temtation (T) for defecting alone, and 
sucker (S) for cooperating alone (with absolute values T > R > P > S). 
 There are several versions of matrices with a varying proportion of payoff T and 
S that fulfill the mathematical criteria of a PDG. By varying this relation, the 
noncorrespondence of outcomes – an index of opponents’ conflict of interest – may 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 The relative frequency of participants in each condition is roughly proportional to standard errors in the 
conditions. After collecting data with approximately equal sample sizes per condition (24-36 
participants), standard errors of the mean difference for the identity salience manipulation were SE = 0.26 
for the interdependent outcomes condition and SE = 0.51 for the independent outcomes condition. 
Therefore, I recollected data in the independent outcomes condition to have a roughly equal standard 
error of the mean difference in the latter condition (SE = 0.19). 
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differ (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959; see also subchapter 1.2.1). To 
avoid a floor effect or ceiling effect in actors’ behavioral tendencies as a function of the 
experimental condition, two PDG matrices with an index of correspondence of r = -.80 
and r = -.88 were pretested (see Figure 2B and 2C). 
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Figure 2. Normal-form representation of PDG matrices; A: formalized with payoffs 
reward (R), punishment (P), temptation (T), and sucker (S); B: with an index of 
correspondence of r = -.80; C: with an index of correspondence of r = -.88 
 
Group identification. As in Study 1, participants in the social identity condition 
answered four items regarding their identification with the group of overestimators or 
underestimators respectively (Doosje et al., 1995; Cronbach’s α = .81). 
 
Reasons for PDG-choice. After participants made their choice in the PDG, they were 
asked for reasons of that choice. They indicated the degree of agreement/disagreement 
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with 10 statements (1 = completely disagree to 7 = completely agree), each two 
assessing one of the following motivations: maximization of the own (group’s) absolute 
outcome (max own; “[…] to earn as much as possible, independently of what the other 
player/group earns.” and “[…] to earn as much as possible, I did not think so much 
about what the other player/group earns.”), maximization of the relative outcome 
difference (max rel; e.g., “[…] to earn more than the other person/group.” and “[…] 
more concerned to maximize the difference to the other player/[group] than to 
maximize my/my group’s absolute outcome.”), minimization of the relative outcome 
difference (min diff; e.g., “[…] to earn the same amount.” and “[…] earnings are fair 
distributed between me/my group and the other player/group.”), maximization of the 
joint outcomes (max joint; e.g., “[…] earn as much as possible together.” and “[…] we 
both/both groups maximize the joint outcome.”), and distrust (distrust; e.g., “[…] afraid 
the other player/group could be egoistic.” and “I did not trust the other player/group.” 
Spearman-Brown corrected reliabilities of the strategy-categories were: rSB = .83 for 
max own, rSB = .61 for max rel, rSB = .89 for min diff, rSB = .85 for max joint, and rSB = 
.75 for distrust. Given the satisfactory intraclass correlations, the item-ratings for each 
category were averaged. 
 
Perceived relative similarity. As argued elsewhere (Insko et al., 2005), in ordinary 
language similarity is often used to describe qualitative categorical affiliation. 
Therefore, as a measure of participants’ self-categorization, I assessed participants’ 
perceived similarity between themselves and the members of their own team (simown; 
“How similar do you perceive the members of your team to yourself?”), and the 
members of the opponent team (simopponent; “How similar do you perceive the members 
of the other team to yourself?”) in the interdependent outcomes condition. Ratings were 
made on 7-point scales from 1 = not similar at all to 7 = extremely similar. To receive a 
single variable of actors’ perceived relative similarity, I computed the algebraic 
difference of similarity ratings to own group members and opponent group members 
(simrel = simown - simopponent). 
 
Analytic strategy 
 
 Again, participants in all conditions made their decisions independently, thus, 
the unit of analyses was the individual. 
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2.2.3  Results 
 
Pretest 
 
 Two PDG matrices with varying indices of outcome correspondence were 
pretested: r = -.80 (see Figure 2B) and r = -.88 (see Figure 2C). Participants (N = 28) 
were students of the University of Jena. They made a decision (either to cooperate or to 
defect) for an anticipated interindividual interaction with an unknown opponent. 
Participants were randomly faced either with matrix 2B or with matrix 2C (14 
participants in each experimental condition).  
On matrix 2B, about 57% (8 out of 14) of participants decided to cooperate and 
about 43% (6 out of 14) decided to defect. On matrix 2C, however, only about 14% (2 
out of 14) decided to cooperate and about 86% (12 out of 14) decided to defect. There 
were significantly more defective choices on matrix 2C than on matrix 2B (p = .046 by 
Fisher’s exact test). In line with the assumption of a stronger conflict of interest with an 
index of correspondence of r = -.88 (2C) than with an index of correspondence of r = -
.80 (2B), post-experimental assessment of choice-reasons showed support for more 
greed and fear involved in anticipated interactions on matrix 2C than on matrix 2B. 
 According to the hypotheses of the present study and the results of Study 1 (see 
subchapter 2.1.3), I expected the highest amount of cooperation in the independent 
outcomes/personal identity condition (compared to the other three experimental 
conditions. The pretest’s framing of the interaction situation matched this condition. 
Therefore, to minimize the probability of a ceiling-effect, matrix 2B was used for the 
main experiment of Study 2. 
 
Descriptive statistics 
 
 Overall, about 45% (75 out of 167) of the participants made a cooperative choice 
and 55% (92 out of 167) made a defective choice.13 Participants in the social identity 
condition showed a medium level of identification with the group they were assigned to 
(overestimators or underestimators; M = 3.62, SD = 1.34), indicating that the social 
categoriy had some value for them. Moreover, participants with a salient social identity 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Three participants were excluded from the analyses because they stated that they already knew the 
PDG from lectures or previous experiments at the end of the experiment. 
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felt more similar to their outcome interdependent team members and more dissimilar to 
the opponent team members compared to participants with a salient personal identity; 
F(1, 58) = 9.32, p = .003, ηp2 = .14; indicating that participants in the social identity 
condition categorized themselves and other participants as members of distinct social 
groups following the meta-contrast principle (e.g., Oakes & Turner, 1986; Turner et al., 
1987). 
 
Behavior in the PDG by experimental condition 
 
 The relative frequencies of defective PDG-choices in each experimental 
condition are shown in Table 4. 
 
Table 4. Percentage of defective PDG-choices by experimental condition 
 
 
Interdependent outcomes Independent outcomes 
Social identity 75 60 
Personal Identity 43 50 
 
Because PDG-choice (either C/cooperation or D/defection) was assessed as a 
dichotomous variable in the PDG, the appropriate method for analysis is logistic 
regression (sometimes also called logit model). To test whether there was a (standard) 
discontinuity effect, the contrast between the interdependent outcomes/social identity 
condition and the independent outcomes/personal identity condition was used as a 
single predictor for PDG-choice in a logistic regression. As expected, there were more 
competitive choices in the interdependent outcomes/social identity condition than in the 
independent outcomes/personal identity condition; B = 1.10, SE = 0.54, χ2(1, N = 80) = 
4.11, p = .044, OR = .33. 
To examine the influence of outcome interdependence and identity salience on 
PDG-choices independently from each other, I used both variables and their interaction 
term to predict PDG-choice. Only identity salience emerged as a significant predictor of 
PDG-choice; B = 0.89, SE = 0.35, χ2(1, N = 167) = 6.43, p = .011, OR = 2.43. About 
64% (49 out of 76) of the participants with a salient social identity, but only 47% (43 
out of 91) of the participants with a salient personal identity made a defective choice. In 
other words, when holding all other predictors constant, participants with a salient 
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social identity were 2.4 times more likely to defect than participants with a salient 
personal identity. The main effect of outcome interdependence and the interaction of the 
two factors did not produce significant effects in the analysis; both χ2(1, N = 167) < 2.5, 
p > .15.  
 
Reasons for PDG-choice and the role of perceived relative similarity 
 
 To check the association of participants’ motivations and their respective 
choices in the PDG, I correlated the assessed motivations with PDG-choice (see Table 
5); all correlations were in the expected directions.  
 
Table 5. Correlation of defective PDG-choices (D) and reasons 
 Defective 
PDG-choice 
(D) 
Max own Max rel Min diff Max joint 
Max own .40**     
Max rel .44**   .49**    
Min diff -.50**   -.66**  -.45**   
Max joint -.59**   -.64**   -.47**     .72**  
Distrust .18* .06 .08 -.03 -.09 
Note. Maximization of absolute outcome (max own), maximization of relative outcome difference (max 
rel), minimization of outcome difference (min diff), maximization of joint outcomes (max joint);                           
** p < .01, * p < .05 
 
I was particularly interested in detecting the underlying motivations that might 
account for the effect of identity salience on PDG-choice. To answer this question, a 
multiple mediation analysis as recommended by Preacher and Hayes (2008) was 
performed. This procedure allows generating estimates for indirect effects in a multiple 
mediator model, which reduces the likelihood of parameter bias due to omitted variables 
as it may occur in several simple mediator models (Judd & Kenny, 1981). Thus, indirect 
effects of identity salience on PDG-choice through the proposed mediators max own, 
max rel, min diff, max joint, and distrust were estimated (see Figure 3). 
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Figure 3. Multiple mediation model for the effect of identity salience on PDG-choice 
 
Direct effects (a and b paths) as well as estimates and bias corrected 
bootstrapped 95%-confidence intervals for indirect effects (a*b paths) of all proposed 
mediator variables are shown in Table 6. The only indirect path that did not contain 
Zero in the intervals is that of max rel, indicating its significant indirect effect (p < .05). 
Social identity salience increased the motivation to maximize the relative outcome 
difference to the opponent(s); B = -0.52, SE = 0.23, p = .023. In turn, max rel predicted 
defective PDG-choices; B = 0.40, SE = 0.18, p = .025. Finally, when controlling for 
max rel (and all other mediator variables), the (direct) effect of identity salience on 
PDG-choice dropped to non-significance; B = -0.80, SE = 0.44, χ2(1, N = 167) = 3.35, p 
= .067. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Identity 
salience 
PDG-choice Min diff 
Max rel 
Max own 
Max joint 
Distrust 
a1      b1 
a2      b2 
a3       b3 
a4       b4 
a5       b5 
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Table 6. Direct and indirect effects of the multiple mediation model 
Direct effects Indirect effect 
a path b path a*b path 
Bootstrapped 
BC 95% CI 
Proposed 
mediator 
 
 
B 
 
 
SE 
 
 
p 
 
 
B 
 
 
SE 
 
 
p 
 
 
B 
 
 
SE Low Up 
Max own  0.16 0.32 .626 -0.13 0.14 .374 -0.02 0.08 -.316  .064 
Max rel -0.52 0.23 .023  0.40 0.18 .025 -0.21 0.16 -.641 -.003 
Min diff  0.03 0.29 .921 -0.25 0.17 .143 -0.01 0.10 -.248  .156 
Max joint  0.13 0.27 .627 -0.72 0.19 .001 -0.09 0.22 -.558  .330 
Distrust -0.21 0.28 .465  0.20 0.12 .082 -0.04 0.08 -.270  .064 
Note. Proposed mediators: maximization of absolute outcome (max own), maximization of relative 
outcome difference (max rel), minimization of outcome difference (min diff), maximization of joint 
outcomes (max joint), distrust; a path: identity salience on proposed mediator; b path: proposed mediator 
on PDG-choice (controlling for identity salience); BC 95% CI: bias corrected 95% confidence interval 
with lower (low) and upper (up) border, 10,000 bootstrap resamples, CIs that do not contain Zero 
indicate a significant indirect effect with p < .05 
 
I was interested how participants’ perceived relative similarity relates to their 
motivation to compete (max rel), and PDG-choice. Unfortunately, perceived relative 
similarity could be deduced from similarity ratings to members of the own team and the 
opponent team in the interdependent outcomes condition only (as there were no teams 
in the independent outcomes condition). Therefore, I tested whether perceived relative 
similarity might account for behavioral differences within the interdependent outcomes 
condition (salient personal vs. social identity). In line with the meta-contrast principle, I 
expected that interdependent team members with a salient social identity perceive 
greater similarity to own group members than to opponent group members, and that this 
motivates them to maximize relative outcomes, which would result in more defective 
PDG-choices relative to interdependent team members. In other words, the effect of 
identity salience (X) on PDG-choice (Y) should be sequentially mediated by 
participants’ relative similarity (M1) and the motivation max rel (M2). Figure 4 displays 
the respective paths in the hypothesized three-path mediation model.  
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Figure 4. Proposed three-path mediation model 
 
Following the recommendations of Taylor, MacKinnon, and Tein (2008), I first 
estimated the impact of identity salience on relative similarity (path 1); B = -0.77, SE = 
0.25, β = -.38, p = .003. This result indicates that team members with a salient social 
identity perceived greater similarity to their outcome interdependent team members and 
more dissimilarity to members of the opponent team compared to team members with a 
salient personal identity. Second, the impact of relative similarity on max rel was 
estimated, while controlling for identity salience (path 2); B = 0.52, SE = 0.19, β = .34, p 
= .009. Perceived relative similarity intensified the motivation to maximize the relative 
outcome difference.14 Finally, I estimated the impact of the max rel on the PDG-choice, 
while controlling for identity salience and relative similarity (path 3); B = 1.07, SE = 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Edwards (1994) suggested using both minuend and subtrahend as single predictors in the regression 
equation instead of their difference score to overcome various methodological problems that arise when 
using algebraic difference scores as independent variables (see also Cronbach & Furby, 1970). However, 
he also claimed that the model implied by the algebraic difference score is tenable if certain requirements 
are fulfilled: minuend and subtrahend have to be significant predictors if entered simultaneously in the 
equation, and the coefficients of the components have to be opposite in sign and not significantly 
different in absolute magnitude (see Edwards, 1994 for further information). In fact, regressing max rel 
on both simown and simopponent simultaneously revealed that the requirements were not violated (simown: B 
= 0.62, SE = 0.21, β = .51, p = .004; simopponent: B = -0.67, SE = 0.19, β = -.59, p = .001). I am therefore 
confident regarding the validity of the reported results. 
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0.31, χ2(1, N = 59) = 12.10, p = .001.15 Mediation in three-path mediation models can be 
shown using the joint significance test, which offers good control for Type-I errors and 
has good power performance (MacKinnon, Lockwood, Hoffman, West, & Sheets, 
2002). According to the joint significance test, all three paths have to be significantly 
different from zero. As this was the case in the present model, I conclude that the three-
path model of mediation supports the assumption that identity salience affects PDG-
choices through a meditational chain of perceived relative similarity and an associated 
concern to maximize relative outcome differences. Alternating the sequence of the 
mediators (X  M2  M1  Y) produced a non-significant effect of relative similarity 
on PDG-choice, while controlling for identity salience and max rel (path 3); B = 0.80, 
SE = 0.55, p = .147. This supports the proposed order of the two mediators. 
 
2.2.4  Discussion 
 
 Study 2 replicated the findings of Study 1 with a rather conservative and often 
used mixed-motive situation, the prisoner’s dilemma game. Again, a significant 
discontinuity effect emerged that was due to a significant main effect of identity 
salience. As in Study 1, outcome interdependence and the outcome interdependence × 
identity salience interaction did not significantly account for any further variance, even 
though the sample size was sufficiently large to detect medium effect sizes (1 - beta = 
.97; J. Cohen, 1988; Faul et al., 2009).  
 Furthermore, the experiment revealed additional insights into the psychological 
processes that might underlie the effect of identity salience on PDG-choice. First, a 
multiple mediation analysis revealed that participants in the social identity condition 
were more concerned to maximize the relative gain (max rel) than participants in the 
personal identity condition. Furthermore, the increase in defective choices in the social 
identity condition compared to the personal identity condition can be attributed to this 
type of motivation, indexing a competitive ingroup bias. This finding is consistent with 
previous studies demonstrating that the tendency to maximize the relative advantage of 
one’s own group may account for increased defection by groups compared to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Estimations of path 1 and 2 were obtained with linear regressions, whereas path 3 was estimated with 
logistic regression. Regression equations were M1 = β01 + β1X + ɛ1 for path 1, M2 = β02 + β2M1 + β5X + ɛ2 
for path 2, and Y = β03 + β4X + β3M2 + β6M1 + ɛ3 for path 3, with β01, β02, β03 being the intercepts and ɛ1, 
ɛ2, ɛ3 being the residuals. 
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individuals (e.g., Insko et al., 2005; Pinter et al., 2007; Wildschut et al., 2001, 2001). 
Moreover, analyses of the interdependent outcomes condition supported the assumption 
that the increased competitive motivation and the resultant boost of defective PDG-
choices was mediated by participants’ perceived relative similarity to their team 
members (more similar to own team members than to opponent team members). This 
finding was in line with my prediction that the minimal group assignment increases 
participants’ social identity salience and that this may be sufficient to increase 
competitiveness in interaction with outgroup members compared to actors with a salient 
personal identity who interacted with random team members and opponents. Results 
suggested that actors’ motivation to maximize the relative outcome difference to the 
opponent(s) might be rather a result of social identity processes than of structural 
differences between interindividual and intergroup interactions (i.e., participants’ 
outcome interdependence), supporting the identity-based perspective on interindividual-
intergroup discontinuity. 
 However, neither Study 1 nor Study 2 included a “relative” manipulation-check 
of identity salience in the social identity and personal identity condition across both 
outcome interdependence conditions. Although Study 2 provided initial support for the 
notion that participants’ perceived relative similarity to other actors might account for 
behavioral differences in the interdependent outcomes condition (interdependent 
outcomes/social identity vs. interdependent outcomes/personal identity), it is not clear 
whether there are similar or different psychological processes at work in the 
independent outcomes condition (independent outcomes/social identity vs. independent 
outcomes/personal identity). One might argue that a salient categorical distinction into 
ingroup and outgroup may be easily triggered through a minimal group manipulation in 
the interdependent outcomes condition, as there are teams and not individuals as 
opponents. However, it is questionable whether categorization processes may also 
account for the (anyway smaller) behavioral differences in the independent outcomes 
condition where interactions are factual between two individuals. Study 3 addressed this 
limitation in the process analysis of the independent outcomes condition. 
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2.3  STUDY 3 
 
 With the present study I aimed to shed light on the behavioral differences among 
independent actors (1 : 1) with a salient personal vs. social identity and the underlying 
psychological processes. 
Study 2 was only able to show the influence of perceived social categorization 
on mixed-motive game behavior in the interdependence outcomes condition. This was 
due to the utilized measure of perceived relative similarity, based on the meta-contrast 
principle of social categorization (e.g., Turner et al., 1987), and requiring similarity 
ratings of opponents relative to the own team. There were no interacting teams in the 
present study and, therefore, similarity to the opponent could only be assessed 
absolutely. However, absolute similarity to the opponent is a less accurate 
representation of the meta-contrast ratio than the similarity of own team members 
relative to opponent team members (relative similarity), as measured in Study 2. 
Additionally, it has been shown that the link between social identity salience and 
ingroup bias cannot be reduced to a mere effect of perceived similarity (Billig & Tajfel, 
1973), although both factors may often occur together and perceived relative similarity 
may be a proxy of categorical affiliation in ordinary language (Insko et al., 2005).  
To overcome these limitations in the psychological assessment of identity 
salience in the present study, I used a measure of identity salience that (1) can be 
applied to an experimental context with individual opponents, and (2) that does not 
depend on similarity ratings: actors’ perceived categorization.  
 
2.3.1  Hypotheses 
 
I expected that participants in the social identity condition would be less 
cooperative than participants in the personal identity condition. Moreover, this effect 
should be mediated by participants’ perceived categorization (see Figure 5). 
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Figure 5. Proposed mediation model 
 
2.3.2  Method 
 
Participants and experimental design 
 
Participants were 72 students (22 men, 50 women) from various disciplines of 
the University of Jena. Age of participants ranged from 19 to 40 years (MD = 23). All 
participants had the possibility to earn up to 7 € (overall earnings of M = 3.27 €). The 
experiment used a one-factorial (identity salience: personal vs. social identity) between-
subjects design. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the experimental 
conditions (36 participants in each condition with 18 participants per experimental 
session). 
 
Procedure 
 
 The procedure and manipulation of identity salience was identical to Studies 1 
and 2: Participants in the social identity condition interacted with an individual member 
of the opposite social category (overestimator : underestimator). Participants in the 
personal identity condition had a randomly chosen opponent (random opponent 
matching). Participant’s decision affected only his or her own and the opponent’s 
outcome (1 : 1, independent outcomes). After the instructions but before participants 
made their decisions, their perceived categorization was assessed. After decision-
making, participants filled out a short post-experimental questionnaire assessing 
demographics, then they were paid and dismissed. The whole experiment took about 30 
minutes. 
M	  Perceived	  categorization	  	  
Y	  PDG-­‐choice	  	  X	  Identity	  salience	  	  
a	   b	  
c	  
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE	   49 
Dependent variables 
 
Behavior in a PDG. Participants were faced with the same PDG matrix (including the 
same incentive scheme) as in Study 2 (see Figure 2B in subchapter 2.2.2). 
 
Group identification. As in the previous studies, participants in the social identity 
condition answered four items regarding their identification with the social category 
they were assigned to (Doosje et al., 1995; Cronbach’s α = .79). 
 
Perceived categorization. To measure participants’ self-categorization, their cognitive 
representation of the aggregate of all participants in the experimental session was 
assessed. Following S. L. Gaertner, Mann, Murrell, and Dovidio (1989), participants 
were asked how much they perceived the participants of the experimental session as (1.) 
one group, (2.) two groups, or (3.) individuals (all items presented on the same screen). 
Ratings were made on 7-point scales from 1 = completely disagree to 7 = completely 
agree. 
 
Analytic strategy 
 
 As in Studies 1 and 2, participants made their decisions independently, thus, the 
unit of analyses was the individual. 
 
2.3.3  Results 
 
Descriptive statistics 
 
 Tables 7 shows the relative frequencies of defective PDG-choices, as well as 
mean values and standard deviations of perceived categorization, separately for each 
experimental condition. Overall, about 38% (27 out of 72) of the participants made a 
cooperative choice and 63% (45 out of 72) made a defective choice. Participants in the 
social identity condition showed a medium level of identification with the social group 
they were assigned to according to their result in the judgment task (overestimators or 
underestimators; M = 3.53, SD = 1.29), indicating that the social category was valuable 
for them. 
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Table 7. Percentage of defective PDG-choices, mean values and standard deviations of 
perceived categorization by experimental condition 
Experimental 
condition 
PDG-choice 
Perceived 
categorization 
  One group Two groups Individuals 
Personal identity 53 
3.36  
(1.55) 
2.50  
(1.54) 
5.78  
(1.40) 
Social identity 72 
3.58  
(2.05) 
3.94  
(2.24) 
5.72 
(1.86) 
Note. Standard deviations in brackets 
 
Behavior in the PDG by experimental condition 
 
 Nineteen out of thirty-six participants in the personal identity condition defected, 
whereas twenty-six out of thirty-six participants in the social identity condition did so, 
yielding a significant difference (path c); B = 0.84, SE = 0.50, χ2(1, N = 72) = 2.85, p = 
.046 (one-tailed), OR = 2.33. In other words, participants with a salient social identity 
were 2.3 times more likely to defect than participants with a salient personal identity. 
 
Perceived categorization 
 
 Overall, perception of all participants as individuals correlated negatively with 
perception of all participants as one group (r = -.29, p = .013), but not with perception 
of all participants as two groups (r = -.09, p = .463). Perception as one group and two 
groups correlated negatively (r = -.22, p = .069). To examine whether the manipulation 
of identity salience had a significant effect on perceived categorization, I conducted 
one-way analyses of variance (ANOVA) for the perception of all participants as 
individuals, two groups, and one group separately. There was a significant difference 
between the social identity and personal identity conditions on the perception of two 
groups; F(1, 71) = 10.16, p = .002, ηp2 = .13. As expected, participants in the social 
identity condition perceived the aggregate of all participants more as two distinct groups 
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compared to participants in the personal identity condition. Values of perceptions as 
individuals and one group did not differ between conditions (both Fs < 1).16  
To test whether perception of all participants as two groups relates to behavioral 
differences in the PDG, a mediation analysis as recommended by Preacher and Hayes 
(2004) was performed. In a first step, perceived categorization as two groups was 
regressed on identity salience. Identity salience predicted perceived categorization as 
two groups (path a); B = -1.44, SE = 0.45, p = .002. In a second step, PDG-choice was 
regressed on identity salience and perceived categorization as two groups 
simultaneously (path b). The relation of perceived categorization as two groups and 
PDG-choice was significant; B = 0.37, SE = 0.15, p = .015. Importantly, the bias-
corrected bootstrapped 95% confidence interval of the product term of path a and b did 
not include Zero, indicating a significant indirect effect; B = -0.53, SE = 0.32, CI95  = [-
1.35, -.11]. The direct effect of identity salience on PDG-choice while controlling for 
perceived categorization as two groups was no longer significant (path c´); B = -0.44, 
SE = 0.54, p = .418. Taken together, the mediation analysis supports the assumption that 
actors in the social identity condition perceived all persons in the experimental session 
more as members of two distinct groups than persons the personal identity condition, 
which in turn produced a behavioral difference in PDG-choices, that is more defection 
in the social identity condition than in the personal identity condition. 
 
2.3.4  Discussion 
 
 Results of Study 3 confirmed the hypotheses: There was a meaningful 
behavioral difference between the personal and social identity conditions. Under social 
identity salience actors were about two-times more likely to defect than actors under 
personal identity salience. This effect is remarkable because actors interacted as 
individuals, without positive outcome interdependence between participants. The 
finding is supportive of the robustness of the proposed identity-based perspective on 
interindividual-intergroup discontinuity.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Alternatively, one may argue that social identity salience is characterized by the difference between 
participants’ perceptions of all participants as separate individuals and two groups. Predicting the 
algebraic difference score by identity salience revealed a significant effect; F(1, 71) = 5.94, p = .017, ηp2 
= .13. This indicates that participants in the social identity condition perceived all persons more as 
members of two groups relative to their perception of all persons as separate individuals than participants 
in the personal identity condition did. 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE	   52 
In addition, the mediation analysis supported the assumption that actors’ 
perceived categorical distinction of all participants in in ingroup and outgroup was 
accountable for the effect. Insko and colleagues (2005, Study 2) found that actors who 
interacted with outgroup members perceived all subjects more as two groups than actors 
who interacted with ingroup members. In Insko and colleagues’ study all actors acted 
under social identity salience (i.e., all opponents were assigned according to a minimal 
group procedure) and behavioral differences can be attributed to a salient ingroup vs. 
outgroup differentiation. The previous study, however, is the first one that can attribute 
a behavioral difference in mixed-motive game behavior to a mere effect of identity 
salience (i.e., salient personal vs. social identity) in the context of interindividual (i.e., 
outcome independent) interactions. In other words, defection under social identity 
salience with outgroup members may not only be more prevalent compared to 
interactions under social identity salience with ingroup members (as shown by Insko et 
al., 2005), but also compared to interactions with random opponents under personal 
identity salience. 
 In Studies 1, 2, and 3, identity salience was manipulated via an artificial minimal 
group assignment procedure. This procedure allowed disentangling the impact of 
identity salience on interindividual-intergroup discontinuity from other factors that are 
typically confounded with social categorization in the classical discontinuity paradigm 
(e.g., positive outcome interdependence among team members). In order to establish 
identity salience as a potential source of the standard discontinuity effect, however, it is 
necessary to show that social identity salience is in fact induced in the classical 
discontinuity paradigm, that is, in the absence of an artificial minimal group 
manipulation. Therefore, the next experiment aimed at investigating a possible source of 
social identity salience within the classical discontinuity paradigm that is only available 
for team actors but not for individual actors: intragroup discussions prior to decision-
making. 
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2.4  STUDY 4 
 
Identity salience is often conceptualized (and operationalized) as the likelihood 
that one identity will be activated in a give context (i.e., personal or social identity). 
According to Tajfel (1978, 1981) there are several features of social situations that 
might lead people shifting from a personal identity salience to a social identity salience, 
for instance impermeable group boundaries, the clarity of awareness of group 
membership, and the extent to which the group membership is associated with positive 
or negative evaluations.  
In the context of the classical discontinuity paradigm, there are two structural 
features of the interaction situation that might increase social distinctiveness and 
facilitate social identity salience in the intergroup interaction condition: intergroup and 
intragroup discussions. On the one hand, discussions between opponents prior to 
decision-making are not exclusive to the intergroup interaction condition – they may be 
either between individual opponents (interindividual interaction condition) or between 
opposing teams (intergroup interaction condition). Between-opponent discussion may 
increase the discontinuity effect because trust is more effectively established in 
interindividual discussion than in intergroup discussion (Wildschut et al., 2003; see also 
subchapter 1.2.1). Therefore, the effect of between-opponent discussion on 
interindividual-intergroup discontinuity might be rather driven by a “positive” effect of 
interindividual discussion (i.e., leading to more cooperation) than by a “negative” effect 
of intergroup discussions (i.e., leading to less cooperation). Because these mechanisms 
are inherently confounded, it is difficult to “filter” the mere effect of intergroup 
discussion on identity salience. On the other hand, intragroup discussions are an 
exclusive characteristic of intergroup interactions, as there are no team members with 
whom individual actors can discuss. A large body of research on the group discussion 
effect indicates that an intragroup discussion, as it has been present in many of the 
previous studies on the discontinuity effect, creates commitments and a common 
ingroup identity by emphasizing the similarities to the ingroup members, which in turn 
increases the motivation to act in the interest of the own group (for reviews see Sally, 
1995; Samuelson & Watrous-Rodriguez, 2010). In other words, actors’ identity as 
group members becomes salient through intragroup discussion, resulting in the 
motivation to act in the interest of the discussion group “without regard to any self-
interest calculus at all” (Van de Kragt, Dawes, Orbell, Braver, & Wilson, 1986, p. 181). 
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Consequently, group members having an intragroup discussion prior to an intergroup 
interaction should be more likely to defect than individual actors, but also compared to 
members of a team who did not engage in an intragroup discussion (e.g., Bornstein, 
1992; Bornstein, Rapoport, Kerpel, & Katz, 1989; Halevy, Bornstein, & Sagiv, 2008). 
In the present study, I was interested in investigating the effect of intragroup discussion 
on the activation of social identity salience. Therefore, the minimal group assignment 
procedure was replaced with an intragroup discussion manipulation. The basic idea was 
that a group discussion alone suffices to create a common social identity, and 
consequently should lead to less cooperative choices in a subsequent intergroup 
interaction. 
Introducing intragroup discussions, however, entails problems with regard to 
confounding variables. First, as intragroup discussions are only available prior to 
intragroup or intergroup interactions, the influence of actors’ identity salience on 
decision-making is confounded with actors’ outcome interdependence. Second, 
intragroup discussions might not only create a salient social identity among participants 
of such a discussion. It has been argued that group discussions might also increase the 
chances that the individually rational solution for a mixed-motive situation is identified, 
leading to more selfish choices (Bornstein et al., 2004; Bornstein & Yaniv, 1998; Davis, 
1992; Kerr, MacCoun, & Kramer, 1996). According to this group rationality 
hypothesis, decreased cooperation following an intragroup discussion might be rather a 
result of actors’ better understanding of the complex game situation, strengthening the 
tendency to act selfishly (i.e., defect). Testing for a specific link between intragroup 
discussions and social identity salience thus requires a control for outcome 
interdependence and rationality effects.  
These issues were addressed in the present study as follows: The experiment 
contained three conditions. In a standard baseline condition, individual (outcomes 
independent) actors played a PDG against another randomly assigned opponent without 
having participated in a group discussion (personal identity salient, no rational insight 
due to group discussion). All other actors were first assigned to separate discussion 
groups and discussed the rules of the game and possible strategies. Subsequently, each 
participant had to select an individual response for a PDG that was played against an 
individual member of a different discussion group (social identity salient/outgroup 
opponent, potential increase in rational insight due to group discussion), but they also 
had to make a decision for a PDG that was played against another individual member of 
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their own discussion group (social identity salient/ingroup opponent, potential increase 
in rational insight due to group discussion).17 
Importantly, as all actors interacted individually (1 : 1), outcome 
interdependence cannot account for any behavioral differences between the 
experimental conditions. Moreover, the experimental design allowed us to test two 
hypotheses: According to the social identity hypothesis (e.g., Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 
1986), participants attending a group discussion prior to decision-making should select 
more defective choices when playing against a member of a different discussion group 
than when playing against a member of their own discussion group. This reflects an 
increased competitiveness that is due to a motivation to optimize the relative advantage 
of the own group compared to another group. According to the group rationality 
hypothesis (e.g., Bornstein & Yaniv, 1998), however, actors in the group discussion 
condition should select more selfish choices compared to individuals that had not 
participated in a group discussion, regardless of whether the PDG is played against a 
member of the own discussion group or against a member of another discussion group. 
If, as a result of an intragroup discussion, the defective choice is perceived as being the 
most rational choice, it is then irrelevant whether opponents are ingroup or outgroup 
members.18 
 
2.4.1  Hypotheses 
 
Following the group discussion effect literature, I expected that an intragroup 
discussion would be sufficient to make actors social identity salient. Accordingly, I 
hypothesized that interactions between outcome independent actors of different 
discussion groups (i.e., social identity salient/outgroup members) would be less 
cooperative than interactions between members of the same discussion group (i.e., 
social identity salient/ingroup members), as well as interactions between opponents that 
did not have an intragroup discussion prior to decision-making (i.e., personal identity 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Participants were informed before the discussions that they had to play against members of another 
discussion group. They were not explicitly informed of the decision they had to make regarding a game 
against another person of the same discussion group in order to prevent that specific commitments and 
arrangements were made regarding intragroup interactions. 
18 Even though actors might expect that ingroup members are more likely to cooperate than outgroup 
members (e.g., Brewer, 2008), they are always better off by choosing defection as u(D, C) > u(C, C), 
which is from their individual perspective the dominant strategy. 
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salient/random opponents). However, according to the group rationality hypothesis 
(e.g., Bornstein & Yaniv, 1998), interactions that followed an intragroup discussion – 
irrespective whether with ingroup or outgroup opponents – should be less cooperative 
than interactions without a preceding discussion.  
 
2.4.2  Method 
 
Participants and experimental design 
 
Participants were 48 students and staff members (15 men, 33 women) from 
various disciplines of the University of Jena. Age of the participants ranged from 19 to 
31 years (MD = 24). All participants got a show-up fee of 2.5 € and had the possibility 
to earn additionally up to 7 € (M = 4.50 €). The experiment used a 2 (intragroup 
discussion: discussion vs. no discussion; between-subjects) × 3 (opponent: random vs. 
ingroup vs. outgroup; within/between-subjects, ingroup and outgroup nested within the 
discussion condition) mixed design. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the 
two between-subjects conditions. All participants made two decisions: Participants in 
the discussion condition decided whether to cooperate or defect with an opponent (1) 
from their own discussion group (ingroup) and (2) from the other discussion group 
(outgroup). Participants in the no discussion condition made two independent decisions 
with randomly selected opponents. Respective cell sample sizes were balanced over the 
between-subjects factors (24 in each condition). 
 
Procedure 
 
Participants registered for the experimental sessions, each consisting of 12 
participants. After arrival at the laboratory they were seated individually in cubicles. 
Instructions and decision-making were computer-mediated. The welcome procedure 
was similar to previous studies. First, participants got trained on the interactive 
decision-making task, including instructions, examples and test questions. Afterwards, 
participants in the discussion condition were randomly assigned to one of two 
discussion groups: A or B. They were told that both groups (each consisting of 6 
participants) would have a 10-minutes discussion on the decision situation in a separate 
room. It was further explained that after the discussion each of them would have to 
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interact independently (1 : 1) with an opponent from the other discussion group. 
Participants were then guided to the two discussion rooms (both located on the same 
corridor, opposite to the laboratory), where they were seated around a table with 
printouts of the rules of the game and its payoffs. The experimenter started a video 
camera, recording the discussion and left the room. After 10 minutes the experimenter 
entered the room and guided the participants back to their individual cubicles in the 
laboratory. Then, participants were informed that additionally to the announced 
interaction with an opponent from the other discussion group, there would be also an 
interaction with a randomly selected opponent from their own discussion group. 
Consequently, participants made two decisions. Both decisions were made on the same 
computer-screen, with random left-right-arrangement. One of the decisions was selected 
randomly for payment. Participants in the no discussion condition made also two 
decisions, however, since there was no ingroup and outgroup due to discussion, both 
with randomly selected opponents. Thus, the no discussion condition was equal to the 
personal identity condition in Studies 1, 2 and 3. After making their decisions, 
participants completed a short post-experimental questionnaire assessing demographics, 
were informed about their payoff, paid and dismissed. The whole experiment took about 
30 minutes in the no discussion condition and 45 minutes in the discussion condition. 
 
Dependent variable 
 
 Behavior in a prisoner’s dilemma game on the same PDG-matrix as in Studies 2 
and 3 (see Figure 2B in subchapter 2.2.2) was assessed as a measure of participants’ 
cooperative/defective intent.  
 
Analytic strategy 
 
 Participants in all conditions made individual decisions. However, participants 
made not only one decision as in Studies 2 and 3 but two decisions (discussion 
condition: one decision with an ingroup opponent and one decision with an outgroup 
opponent; no discussion condition: two decisions each with a random opponent). Due to 
this within-subjects manipulation, observations were nested within participants and 
might therefore be interdependent. Moreover, participants in the discussion condition 
were members of specific discussion groups (2 discussion sessions × 2 groups per 
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session [A and B] = 4 separate discussion groups). Hence, participants of same 
discussion groups might be interdependent. This data structure introduces problems 
with respect to appropriate levels of analysis, aggregation bias, and heterogeneity of 
regression (e.g., Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). To address this nested data structure, I 
conducted generalized linear mixed effect model analyses (with a logit link), using the 
lme4 package (Bates, 2007) in the R environment (R Development Core Team, 2008). 
Intragroup discussion and opponent were modeled as fixed factors, whereas participant 
and discussion group were modeled as random factors to control for their error terms 
(random intercept models, e.g., Pinheiro & Bates, 2009). 
 
2.4.3  Results 
 
 Relative Frequencies of defective PDG-choices per experimental condition are 
shown in Table 8.19  
 
Table 8. Percentage of defective PDG-choices by experimental condition 
Opponent Discussion No discussion 
Outgroup  71  
Ingroup  50  
Random  54 
Note. Random opponent choices are averaged over two decisions per participant 
 
 To disentangle the two competing hypotheses, two contrasts were used as 
predictors of PDG-choice (0 = cooperation, 1 = defection). First, in line with the social 
identity hypothesis, a 2 (discussion/outgroup opponent) -1 (discussion/ingroup 
opponent) -1 (no discussion/random opponent) contrast was tested. The contrast was 
significant; B = 0.97, SE = 0.56, z = 1.73, p = .042 (one-tailed). As predicted, actors 
who had an intragroup discussion prior to an outgroup interaction were more defective 
than actors who either had an intragroup discussion prior to an ingroup interaction or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 One participant was excluded from the analyses because he/she stated that he/she already knew the 
PDG from lectures or previous experiments at the end of the study. 
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who had no intragroup discussion prior an interaction with a random opponent.20 
Second, in line with the group rationality hypothesis, a 1 (discussion/outgroup 
opponent) 1 (discussion/ingroup opponent) -2 (no discussion/random opponent) contrast 
was tested. The contrast missed conventional criteria of significance; B = 0.30, SE = 
0.49, z = 0.60, p = .55.  
 
2.4.4  Discussion 
 
 The current study investigated the underlying psychological process that might 
be responsible for the relation of intragroup discussions prior to intergroup decision-
making and the interindividual-intergroup discontinuity effect. I contrasted two 
different explanations why intragroup discussions might increase the discontinuity 
effect: the social identity hypothesis (e.g., Van de Kragt et al., 1986) and the group 
rationality hypothesis (e.g., Bornstein & Yaniv, 1998). Results supported the social 
identity hypothesis: Independent actors were less cooperative in interaction with 
outgroup opponents than with ingroup opponents or random opponents. In contrast to 
the group rationality hypothesis, however, ingroup and outgroup opponent interactions 
following an intragroup discussion were not less cooperative than interactions among 
random opponent without a preceding discussion. Importantly, actors outcome 
interdependence cannot account for the findings, as opponent in all conditions acted 
under conditions of outcome independence (1 : 1). 
 Thus, the results of the present experiment supported my assumption that 
intragroup discussions are a possible source of actors’ social identity salience in the 
classical experimental paradigm on interindividual-intergroup discontinuity. This 
indicates that identity salience is not only sufficient to produce the interindividual-
intergroup discontinuity effect (see Studies 1, 2, and 3), but might also have contributed 
to the discontinuity effects found in previous research (at least if there was an 
intragroup discussion prior to intergroup decision-making).   
It should be noted that the statistical test power in the present experiment was 
rather poor due to the small sample size and the nested data structure (for further 
discussion see Snijders, 2005). This might be an important limitation when rejecting 
hypotheses like the group rationality hypothesis in the present experiment (J. Cohen, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Additionally, the simple contrast between ingroup and outgroup member opponent within the 
discussion condition was significant; B = 1.16, SE = 0.65, z = 1.77, p = .035 (one-tailed). 
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1988). However, the current study was designed to distinguish between behavioral 
differences following an intragroup discussion either due to actors’ social identity 
salience or due to actors’ rational comprehension. As the data supported the former but 
not the latter hypothesis, I argue that identity processes become an important predictor 
of mixed-motive game behavior following an intragroup discussion. It might still be the 
case that intragroup discussions increase actors’ rational insight in the game structure 
and I abstain from further interpreting this null-effect. 
 In sum, the present study clearly supported the assumption that intragroup 
discussions prior to intergroup interactions may create or strengthen the salience of 
social identity. As those discussions took place in most of previous experiments on 
interindividual-intergroup discontinuity, identity salience might at least partially 
account for the discovered discontinuity effects, further supporting the proposed 
identity-based perspective on interindividual-intergroup discontinuity. 
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3 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
This dissertation investigated minimal conditions for the interindividual-
intergroup discontinuity effect, that is, the tendency for intergroup relations to be less 
cooperative than interindividual relations (e.g., Schopler & Insko, 1992; Schopler et al., 
2001). I reviewed previous research, which identified several moderator variables (e.g., 
Wildschut et al., 2003) and offered various explanations (e.g., Wildschut & Insko, 
2007) for this robust phenomenon. 
Aims and research questions of the present studies have been developed with 
regard to two general perspectives of group formation: the interdependence-based and 
the identity-based approach (Campbell, 1958; Wilder & Simon, 1998). Research on the 
discontinuity effect typically treated groups as aggregates of interdependent actors 
(interdependence-based perspective; e.g., Lewin, 1948). However, other researchers 
have argued that the mere representation of individual actors as members of distinct 
social groups (salient social identity) without a factual interdependence between 
ingroup members may create group entitativity (identity-based perspective; e.g., Tajfel, 
1981), resulting in a preference to favor ingroup members relative to outgroup members 
(Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986). This dissertation disentangled the influence of both 
processes – interdependence-based and identity-based group formation – for the 
emergence of the discontinuity effect, offering an identity-based perspective on 
interindividual-intergroup discontinuity. 
 
3.1  DISENTANGLING OUTCOME INTERDEPENDENCE 
AND IDENTITY SALIENCE 
 
3.1.1  Behavioral differences 
 
As outlined in the present thesis, interdependence-based and identity-based 
group processes have been confounded in previous research on interindividual-
intergroup discontinuity. I have claimed that in the intergroup interaction condition of 
the classical discontinuity design actors are both interdependent and have a salient 
social identity. In contrast, actors in the interindividual interaction condition are both 
independent and have a salient personal identity. Thus, relying on previous research it is 
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not possible to state whether the discontinuity effect is due to actors’ independence 
(interindividual interaction) vs. interdependence (intergroup interaction) or due to 
actors’ salient personal identity (interindividual interaction) vs. salient social identity 
(intergroup interaction), or due to a combination of both factors.  
Study 1 was designed to distinguish between the effects of identity salience 
(salient personal vs. social identity) and interdependence (independent vs. 
interdependent actors) on the emergence of interindividual-intergroup discontinuity. For 
this purpose, identity salience and interdependence were manipulated orthogonally. 
Further structural differences between the classical interindividual and intergroup 
interaction conditions were excluded (e.g., intragroup discussion prior to intergroup 
decision-making). Based on social identity theory (SIT; Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986) 
and recent experimental findings (e.g., De Cremer et al., 2008; Wit & Kerr, 2002), I 
expected that mere identity-based groups might be less cooperative than individual 
actors. In other words, identity-based group formation should be sufficient to create the 
discontinuity effect, irrespective of actors’ outcome interdependence. As hypothesized, 
Study 1 revealed a significant main effect of identity salience on proposals in an 
ultimatum bargaining game (UG). Actors with a salient social identity were less 
cooperative – they made smaller offers in the UG – than actors with a salient personal 
identity. There was no effect of outcome interdependence. Hence, to the best of my 
knowledge, this study is the first that attributes a discontinuity effect – indicated by a 
significant contrast between the social identity/interdependent outcomes condition and 
the personal identity/independent outcomes condition – to the mere influence of identity 
salience. 
 
3.1.2  Limitations 
 
One should note that the failure to detect a significant effect of outcome 
interdependence does not mean that a positive interdependence among team members 
might not at all increase the discontinuity effect. Wildschut and colleagues (2003) found 
in a meta-analytic review that procedural interdependence among team members is an 
important moderator of interindividual-intergroup discontinuity. However, outcome 
interdependence – as manipulated in the present research – is only one component of 
procedural interdependence, besides a required consensus among team members to 
reach a joint decision (e.g., Wildschut et al., 2001). Clearly, by manipulating mere 
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outcome interdependence, interdependence among team members was condensed to an 
absolute minimum. Already prior research found that mere outcome interdependence 
between actors of a team did not decrease cooperation in intergroup interactions 
compared to interindividual interactions with outcome independent actors (Insko, 
Pinkley, Harring et al., 1987; Insko et al., 1988).  
It is also important to note that the manipulation of outcome interdependence did 
slightly differ from previous studies. If not using a consensus rule (e.g., Bornstein & 
Yaniv, 1998; Wolf et al., 2008), outcome interdependence was typically created by 
means of a majority rule, that is, the predominant decision of team members served as 
the group’s decision (e.g., T. R. Cohen et al., 2006; Schopler et al., 1995). In contrast, in 
the present research one team member’s decision was selected randomly (with p = 1/3) 
and served as the group’s decision. The main reason to use this procedure was to 
exclude “strategic decisions” in the UG. Because cooperation/defection was measured 
as a continuous variable here (offers and minimum acceptance thresholds may range 
from 0 to 100 ECU), a majority rule would have to be implemented by the mean value 
of team members’ decisions. If actors assume that their team members’ decisions are 
too cooperative or too defective, they might personally decide to make an extreme value 
in the opposite direction to adjust the teams’ mean value according to their personal 
preference. From the perspective of actors’ personal impact on the group decision, both 
procedures are exactly the same, as in both cases the expected impact is 1/3. However, 
it might be that the subjectively perceived impact on the team decision differs between 
both procedures.  
Last but not least, the manipulation of outcome interdependence aimed to 
investigate and control for the mere effect of objective outcome interdependence on the 
interindividual-intergroup discontinuity effect. However, actors with a salient social 
identity might perceive to have a common fate with their ingroup members, that is 
perceived outcome interdependence. Although this distinction goes beyond the scope of 
the present thesis, I argue that perceived interdependence might be an effect of identity-
based group formation (see also Turner, 1999) 
Summing up these possible skepticisms regarding the observed null-effect of 
outcome interdependence: Because outcome interdependence is a specific component of 
(procedural) interdependence and the type of manipulation was exceptional, the null-
effect of actors’ interdependence on decision-making has to be interpreted with caution. 
Nevertheless, the study’s experimental paradigm offers an innovative approach to 
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investigate effects of identity salience on the discontinuity effect while either 
controlling (e.g., outcome interdependence) or excluding (e.g., intragroup discussion) 
alternative influences that were typically confounded with identity salience in the 
classical experimental paradigm on interindividual-intergroup discontinuity. 
 
3.2  UNDERSTANDING THE IMPACT OF IDENTITY 
SALIENCE 
 
3.2.1 Mediation analyses 
 
Studies 2 and 3 were conducted to answer the following questions: How did 
persons in the social identity condition perceive the interaction situations compared to 
persons in the personal identity condition? What was the underlying motivation of 
persons with a salient social identity to defect more than persons with a salient personal 
identity? Inducing social identity salience with an artificial minimal group procedure 
(see Studies 1, 2, and 3) raises the question how mixed-motive game behavior was 
actually affected and what perceptions and motivations might be responsible for the 
detected behavioral difference in Study 1. Additionally, the robustness of the findings 
should be tested across other mixed-motive situations. Therefore, team members’ 
perceived similarity to own and opponent team members (Study 2), and individual 
actors’ perception of all participants as members of one group, members of two groups, 
and separate individuals (Study 3) were assessed. Moreover, Studies 2 and 3 used a 
prisoner’s dilemma game (PDG), assessing cooperation/defection with a binary 
decision. Results of Study 2 showed, in line with the meta-contrast ratio (e.g., Turner et 
al., 1987), that team members perceived greater similarities to members of their own 
team than to members of the opponent team if those team memberships were assigned 
according to the minimal group procedure (social identity condition) than by chance 
(personal identity condition). In the same vein, individual actors categorized other 
participants more as members of two distinct groups in the social identity condition 
compared to the personal identity condition of Study 3. Thus, two different measures 
confirmed the effectiveness of the social identity manipulation. Furthermore, perceived 
relative similarity (Study 2) and perceived categorization as two groups (Study 3) 
mediated the effect of identity salience on mixed-motive game behavior, irrespective of 
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actors’ outcome interdependence (Study 2: interdependent outcomes, Study 3: 
independent outcomes). 
But what was the subjective motivation of persons with a salient social identity 
to defect more than persons with a salient personal identity? A salient social identity 
may give rise to a transformation of an actor’s motivation (e.g., De Cremer & Van 
Vugt, 1999; Kelley & Thibaut, 1978). Therefore, several motivations that might affect 
mixed-motive game behavior were assessed in Study 2. Particularly the distinction 
between the two components of greed – the motivations to maximize absolute outcomes 
(max own) and relative outcomes (max rel) – might be crucial. Explanations of 
interindividual-intergroup discontinuity from the greed and fear perspective (Wildschut 
& Insko, 2007) have stated that either the motivation to selfishly maximize absolute 
outcomes or the motivation to competitively maximize relative outcomes should be 
increased in intergroup interactions compared to interindividual interactions. However, 
following the proposed identity-based perspective on interindividual-intergroup 
discontinuity, I assumed that the motivation to maximize relative outcomes rather than 
absolute outcomes should explain the effect of identity salience on mixed-motive game 
behavior, illustrating a competitive ingroup bias (e.g., Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986). 
Study 2 confirmed this expectation: The motivation to maximize the relative difference 
to the opponent(s) mediated the effect of identity salience on PDG-choice. This finding, 
of course, does not implicate that other motivations for defection in mixed-motive 
games, for instance maximizing absolute outcomes or the fear to become exploited, did 
not affect persons’ behavior. Even in the personal identity condition of Studies 1, 2, and 
3 about half of the participants chose to defect, indicating that other motivations were 
important as well, however, the difference to the (even more defective) social identity 
condition could be attributed to the competitive motivation to maximize relative 
outcomes only (Study 2). Also the findings of Study 1 indicated that both components 
of greed, max own and max rel, were important motivations for defective behavior in 
mixed-motive situations: Only when max own and max rel suggested the same kind of 
behavior like in the proposer role of the UG (i.e., small proposals), there was a 
significant main effect of identity salience. However, when max own and max rel 
suggested opposing kinds of behaviors like in the recipient role of the UG (i.e., max 
own: accept all offers, max rel: accept only offers > 50), there was no effect of identity 
salience. Put simply, only when max own and max rel “act in concert”, max rel can 
make a difference. Given this theoretical and empirical analysis, I would speculate that 
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always when max rel is a mediating motivation of interindividual-intergroup 
discontinuity, identity processes should be at work. If, however, max own is mediating 
behavioral differences, other mechanisms should be responsible. 
One should note that participants’ motivations were assessed after they had 
made their PDG-choices. Therefore, associations between proposed mediators and 
choices might reflect a causal direction of choice on mediator instead of the (proposed) 
reverse. However, the statements regarding the reason for choosing to cooperate or to 
defect were clearly phrased retrospective as potential causes for participants’ choice. 
Additionally, I had theory-grounded hypotheses about specific meditational coherences 
and “competing” mediators were tested against each other in the same analytical model. 
With this, I gained information of mediating variables but also variables that failed to 
fulfill the statistical criteria of mediation at the same time (see also Insko et al., 2001; 
Wildschut et al., 2002). Because of this conservative procedure, I am confident about 
the results’ validity. 
 In sum, mediation analyses provided strong support for the assumption that mere 
identity salience may be sufficient to account for the interindividual-intergroup 
discontinuity effect. 
 
3.2.2  Outlook 
 
Although not tested directly yet, the emergence of an interindividual-intergroup 
discontinuity effect on the basis of mere identity salience has been doubted so far 
(Drigotas et al., 1998; Insko & Schopler, 1987; Insko et al., 1992). The criticism was 
based on the fact that a boost of group members’ self-esteem by means of positive 
distinctiveness may be a plausible explanation for intergroup competition per se, but is 
incomplete to explain why intergroup interactions are more defective than 
interindividual interaction in mixed-motive situations. Clearly, also individual 
opponents should receive positive bolstering self-esteem from being “better” than the 
opponent. So, how could the observed effect of identity salience on mixed-motive game 
behavior be explained? 
As stated earlier (see subchapter 1.4.2), an alternative interpretation of ingroup 
bias in minimal group settings is the epistemic motivation to reduce subjective 
uncertainty through self-categorization (e.g., Hogg, 2000). Self-categorization reduces 
uncertainty because the social comparison process of ingroup and outgroup maintains 
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the distinctiveness of the ingroup (e.g., Hogg, 2001; Hogg & Mullin, 1999). Uncertainty 
reduction might play an important role in the context of discontinuity research because 
mixed-motive situations entail high insecurity about the opponents’ actions, the 
appropriate own action, and the resulting outcomes (social uncertainty, Kramer, 2010). 
I found preliminary support for the uncertainty reduction model in the context of 
interindividual-intergroup discontinuity: Particularly actors who perceived high 
subjective uncertainty regarding the appropriate action in the mixed-motive game, 
categorized all participants more as members of two distinct social groups in the social 
identity condition, and in turn, showed more defective behavior, compared to 
participants who perceived less uncertainty. However, further research is required to 
investigate the role of actors’ subjective uncertainty for the emergence of a mere effect 
of identity salience on mixed-motive game behavior. For instance, I suggest 
manipulating actors’ subjective uncertainty before they engage in an interindividual or 
intergroup mixed-motive interaction. 
 
3.3  THE ROLE OF IDENTITY SALIENCE IN THE 
CLASSICAL EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN  
 
 Using a new experimental paradigm, the mere effect of identity salience on 
mixed-motive game behavior could be disentangled from other factors. The main effect 
of identity salience indicating that there was less cooperation under social identity 
salience than under personal identity salience occurred robustly across different mixed-
motive games and was mediated by the hypothesized mechanisms. However, one might 
still wonder how these findings relate to previous research on the interindividual-
intergroup discontinuity effect. Obviously, the manipulation of social identity salience 
via a minimal group procedure is not present in the classical experimental discontinuity 
design. This procedure was used because it allowed disentangling identity-based and 
interdependence-based effects on mixed-motive game behavior, which have been 
confounded in previous research. I have argued that the mere framing of the interaction 
situation and, in addition, intragroup discussions might trigger social identity salience in 
the classical intergroup interaction condition. Furthermore, the fact that the motivation 
to maximize relative differences is an established mediator of the discontinuity effect 
provides indirect support for the assumption that identity processes were relevant for the 
emergence of previously detected discontinuity effects.  
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Study 4 tested the effect of identity-based processes on PDG-choices by using a 
random group assignment and including intragroup discussions prior to decision-
making, similar to previous studies on interindividual-intergroup discontinuity. In 
contrast to previous research, however, it was controlled for the effects of 
interdependence-based processes and the rational insight that actors might gain through 
intragroup discussion (e.g., Bornstein & Yaniv, 1998). Findings supported the 
hypothesis that intragroup discussions are able to create actors’ social identity salience, 
although the subsequent interactions were between individual actors and not between 
team actors. Notwithstanding that I find the assumption plausible that a discussion 
might give actors a better understanding of the decision-making situation, findings of 
Study 4 did not support this hypothesis. Actors did not decide more “rational” (i.e. more 
defective) after having an intragroup discussion. So, even if actors gained insight in the 
game’s rational structure through intragroup discussion, they were at least not using this 
insight for their decision-making. This result is important with regard to the relevance 
of identity processes for the classical interindividual-intergroup discontinuity effect. In 
line with my theoretical and empirical analyzes, I argue that intragroup discussions 
provide a possible source for social identity salience in the intergroup interaction 
condition. Therefore, social identity salience is not only a sufficient factor to produce 
the interindividual-intergroup discontinuity effect but contributes also to the emergence 
of the classical discontinuity effect. 
 
3.4  IMPLICATIONS AND OUTLOOK 
 
 According to the theoretical and empirical investigations of the present 
dissertation, the discontinuity effect is not restricted to interdependence-based groups 
but may also apply for identity-based groups. This supports the generality of 
interindividual-intergroup discontinuity: Previous research claimed that relations 
between group opponents are less cooperative compared to relations between individual 
opponents when there is a positive interdependence between members of each group. 
Expanding this view, the present work suggests that the mere perception of opponents 
as members of distinct social groups may lead to negative interactions (i.e., competitive 
behavior) even without objective interdependences between members of the same social 
group. This has important consequences and implications for research on 
interindividual-intergroup discontinuity.  
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 Certainly, research on pre-conditions and psychological processes of the 
discontinuity effect is interested to find “possible ways of reducing the effect and 
promoting intergroup cooperation” (Wildschut & Insko, 2009). Previous approaches to 
reduce interindividual-intergroup discontinuity related to a transformation of the 
perception of opponents’ negatively interdependent outcomes. For instance, by 
encouraging opponents to think beyond the immediate (one-shot/single) interaction 
situation to the long-term consequences of their behavior may undermine the role of 
short-term interested greed. Research has found that when opponents expected multiple 
interactions (as compared to a single interaction only) the discontinuity effect was 
reduced by a decrease in intergroup defection (Schopler et al., 2001; Wolf et al., 2009). 
Similarly, when the outcomes associated with mutual defection decreased, intergroup 
cooperation increased (Wolf et al., 2008). Both approaches relate to a manipulation of 
actors’ negative outcome interdependence, either in the long-run by making defection 
less profitable over repeated interactions or in the short-run by structurally changing the 
interaction situation. From the perspective of an identity-based view on interindividual-
intergroup discontinuity, changing actors’ identity salience might be another approach 
to decrease intergroup defection and therefore, to reduce the discontinuity effect. 
Following this idea, various strategies have been effectively used to enhance intergroup 
relations in laboratory settings, most prominently the models of recatigorization and 
decategorization (e.g., Brewer & Miller, 1984; S. L. Gaertner et al., 1989; Wilder, 
1978). The basic idea is that members of distinct social groups are induced to 
recategorize the aggregate of all individuals either as one superordinate group or as 
separate individuals who are not members of any particular social category. The 
difference between these two approaches is that by recategorization actors’ social 
identity remains salient but shifts from the (inter)group level to the collective level, 
whereas by decategorization actors’ self-identity transforms from the (inter)group level 
to the personal level. Both recategorization and decategorization has been shown to 
reduce ingroup bias, the former more effectively than the latter (S. L. Gaertner et al., 
1989). In my view, the strategies of recategorization and decategorization could be 
applied to the experimental paradigm on interindividual-intergroup discontinuity and 
might provide an alternative way to decrease the discontinuity effect. Notwithstanding 
an unpublished pilot study reported by Insko and colleagues (2005) that failed to reduce 
the discontinuity effect using a recategorization procedure (but also confounded 
interdependence-based and identity-based processes), I would expect that a merely 
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identity-based discontinuity effect as found in the present Studies 1, 2, and 3, might be 
substantially reduced by recategorization or decategorization procedures. It might be a 
target for future research to answer if and to what extent those strategies can be applied 
to the reduction of identity-based interindividual-intergroup discontinuity.  
 
3.5  RELATED LITERATURE 
 
Whereas the distinction between interdependence-based and identity-based 
group formation and its differential effects on intergroup behavior has been neglected in 
the field of interindividual-intergroup discontinuity, it has been recognized in other 
areas of research on mixed-motive situations or applied contexts.  
For instance, early research on public goods – the G cell in Bornstein’s (2003, 
2008) taxonomy (see subchapter 1.2) – provided strong evidence that social identity 
processes (i.e., group solidarity, group identification) increase public good provisions, 
although the exact psychological processes remained unclear (e.g., Brown-Kruse & 
Hummels, 1993; Dawes, McTavish, J., & Shaklee, H., 1977). Research on team games 
– the G-G cell – showed that public good provisions also increase if the intragroup 
conflict is embedded in an intergroup conflict (for an overview see Bornstein, 2003). In 
a recent experiment, this “intergroup conflict – intragroup cooperation” effect could be 
attributed to actors’ increased social categorization through an anticipated intergroup 
conflict rather than to their common fate (Böhm & Steiger, 2010). In sum, there is a 
good deal of evidence that identity salience may affect actors’ behavior in mixed-
motive situations, regardless of the structure of the conflict situation. 
Moreover, it has recently been shown that actors’ identity salience may have 
important impact on interindividual negotiations (Demoulin & Teixeira, in press; 
Trötschel, Hüffmeier, & Loschelder, in press). Here, it has been found that interactions 
between individual opponents with a salient social identity (i.e., outgroup members) 
compared to opponents with a salient personal identity increased competitive 
perceptions, which resulted in reduced concession behavior, and consequently led to 
inferior negotiation outcomes. As opponents were always individual actors, this 
behavioral difference can be attributed to a mere effect of identity salience, providing 
support for an identity-based discontinuity effect in a rather applied context. 
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This thesis contributes nicely to this literature by expanding the research on 
identity salience effects in social decision-making also to the interindividual-intergroup 
discontinuity effect. 
 
3.6  CONCLUSION 
 
 More than twenty years of research has shown that there is a behavioral 
discontinuity between intergroup interactions and interindividual interactions, the 
former typically being less cooperative than the latter. This effect has important 
consequences for real life situations and it appears to be a scientific challenge to 
examine its structural and psychological foundations. This dissertation contributes to 
the literature on interindividual-intergroup discontinuity by providing a new 
experimental paradigm for investigating its minimal conditions. With this, it was 
possible to disentangle the impact of actors’ outcome interdependence (independent vs. 
interdependent) and actors’ identity salience (personal vs. social identity) on the 
emergence of the discontinuity effect. Throughout the four studies presented in the 
present thesis, actors’ salient personal vs. social identity consistently created behavioral 
differences in different mixed-motive situations. This implies that identity salience may 
be sufficient to create the interindividual-intergroup discontinuity effect. Thus, the 
discontinuity effect may apply to a wide range of situations that have not been 
examined previously (e.g., interactions between individual actors who identify with 
different social groups), offering a merely identity-based perspective on interindividual-
intergroup discontinuity.  
Lets come back to the metaphoric question posed in the title of this dissertation: 
When does the sheep become a wolf? Summing up the findings in an equally 
metaphoric manner: The sheep’s mere representation of belonging to a specific flock 
leads to wolf-like behavior in interaction with sheep from other flocks, irrespective of 
whether its fate is independent or interdependent from other sheep of its own flock in 
this interaction. 
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